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Abstract
We build an occupational-choice general-equilibrium model with for-prot rms, non-prot
organizations, and endogenous private warm-glow donations. Lack of monitoring on the use of funds
implies that an increase of funds of the non-prot sector (because of a higher income in the for-
prot sector, a stronger preference for giving, or an inow of foreign aid) worsens the motivational
composition and performance of the non-prot sector. We also analyze the conditions under which
donors (through linking donations to the motivational composition of the non-prot sector), non-
prots themselves (through peer monitoring), or the government (using a tax-nanced public funding
of non-prots) can eliminate the low-effectiveness equilibrium. We present supporting case-study
evidence from developing-country NGO sector and humanitarian emergencies. (JEL: L31, D64, J24,
D5)
1. Introduction
One major recent global economic phenomenon has been the rising importance of
non-prot and non-governmental organizations as providers of public goods (Brainard
and Chollet, 2008). The massive increase in the number of international NGOs, from
less than 5,000 in mid-1970s to more than 28,000 in 2013, attests to this (Union of
International Associations, 2014; Werker and Ahmed, 2008). In developing countries,
NGOs play a key role in the provision of public health and education services. They
have also become fundamental actors in the empowerment of socially disadvantages
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groups, such as women and ethnic/religious minorities (Brinkerhoff et al., 2007). In
addition, NGOs contribute actively to monitoring adherence by multinational rms to
environmental and labor standards (Yaziji and Doh, 2009).
The expansion of non-prot organizations as economic actors has not been
restricted to the developing world. In the OECD countries they also play a major role as
public good providers, especially in sectors such as health services, arts, education, and
poverty relief (Bilodeau and Steinberg, 2006). Quite remarkably, non-prots represent
a sizeable sector in terms of OECD countries’ employment share: on average, 7.5%
of their economically active population is employed in the non-prot sector. For some
countries (Belgium, Netherlands, Canada, U.K., and Ireland) this share exceeds 10%
(Salamon, 2010).
One distinctive feature concerning the provision of public goods by NGOs is their
nancing structure. Although a part of these organizations’ operational costs is covered
by government grants and by users fees, voluntary private donations also account for
a major share of their budgets. Bilodeau and Steinberg (2006) report that for the 32
countries for which comparable data is available, on average, over 30% of non-prots’
nancing comes from voluntary private giving. Moreover, over 75% of this amount
consists of small donations. Given the public-good nature of the services typically
provided by non-prots, this fact is particularly intriguing, since small donors could
hardly expect their contributions to entail any meaningful effect on total public good
provision.
A simple explanation of this phenomenon is that private contributions to non-
prots are partially motivated by impure altruism. Indeed, research in public and
experimental economics has recurrently shown that rationalizing empirical regularities
about altruism requires the explicit acknowledgment of private psychological benets
accruing to the donor from the act of giving.1 This is the so-called "warm-glow"
motivation, rst modelled by Andreoni (1989).
Impure altruism by donors means, in turn, that the link between the motivation to
give to non-prot organizations and the ultimate provision of public-goods by them
may be very weak.2 In addition, the very nature of the goods and services provided
by non-prot organizations renders impossible to write contracts that condition their
nancing on their output, further weakening the link between donations and public-
good provision.3 These two features, combined with the fact that individuals’ intrinsic
1. See, e.g. Andreoni and Miller (2002), Ribar and Wilhelm (2002), Korenok et al. (2013), and Tonin and
Vlassopoulos (2010).
2. In this paper, we mostly focus on the joy-of-giving (or warm-glow) motive for giving. However, an
additional reason why people might be willing to donate is social-signalling, as modelled by Benabou and
Tirole (2006). Social-signalling would complement and reinforce the joy-of-giving motive that we focus
on in our model. One other reason that would also reinforce the act of giving, without any link to pure
altruism, is tax incentives to giving.
3. See Chapter 12 of Hansmann (1996) and Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996) for detailed discussions on the
issue of incomplete contracts in non-prot organizations.
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motivation is private information, turn the non-prot sector particularly vulnerable to
the misallocation of funds.
In a context where the scope for funds diversion is quite extreme, the size and the
structure of nancing of the non-prot sector may become major factors determining
who enters this sector. This will in turn affect the level of intrinsic motivation of its
managers, and consequently, the performance of the non-prot sector. Analyzing this
key issue requires a general-equilibrium framework. When the non-prot sector is of
non-negligible size, policies that inuence the behavior of non-prot managers will
impact the returns in both the non-prot and for-prot sectors. In such a setting, a
partial-equilibrium model will miss out important sources of market interactions and
may, therefore, lead to misguided policy recommendations (for instance, concerning
the desirability of more extensive state nancing to non-prots or channeling foreign
aid via NGOs).
This paper proposes a tractable occupational-choice general-equilibrium model
with for-prot rms, non-prot organizations and endogenous private donations. The
model rests on ve key assumptions. First, private donors give to non-prots because
of warm-glow motives (i.e., with a weak link to the expected public-good output
generated with their own donations). Second, individuals self-select either into the
for-prot or non-prot sectors, whose returns are endogenous to the model, both
because of aggregate occupational choices and endogenous donations. Third, there
are decreasing returns at the level of single non-prot organizations (because intrinsic
motivation is an essential input in limited supply compared to cash money, and that
mission deepening for non-prots involves increasingly difcult tasks to accomplish).
Fourth, monitoring the behavior and knowing the intrinsic motivation of the non-prot
managers is inherently difcult. Fifth (also resulting from the non-measurability of
non-prots’ output), private donations are shared among the existing non-prots rms
in a manner that is not strictly related to their performance.
The main mechanism in our model relies on the notion that motivational self-
selection into the non-prot sectors may be altered by the level of donations received by
non-prot rms. Imperfect monitoring of managers in the non-prot sector, together
with warm-glow motives by private donors, implies that the scope for misallocation
of funds in this sector expands when private giving rises. Therefore, in a context
of asymmetric information, warm-glow altruism and self-selection interact in non-
monotonic ways, possibly leading to equilibrium with severe misallocation of funds.
Our model generates several important results concerning motivational allocation.
First, selsh motives can crowd out altruistic motivation from the non-prot sector.
When this occurs, the non-prot sector ends up being managed by selsh agents who
exploit the lack of monitoring to divert funds for project dimensions that are misaligned
with the interests of the beneciaries. Moreover, since the scope for misallocation of
funds rises with the level of donations received by each non-prot rm, this problem
is exacerbated in richer economies and in economies where private donors give more
generously. Our model features thus a case where "small is beautiful": motivational
allocation in the non-prot sector tends to be better when the overall nancing of each
non-prot remains small.
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Second, foreign aid intermediation through the non-prot sector in a developing
country may entail perverse effects: it may cause the economy to switch from
an equilibrium with a good allocation to one with a bad allocation of pro-social
motivation. One further implication of this result is that total output of the non-prot
can become non-monotonic in the amount of foreign aid. At low levels of foreign aid, a
small increase in aid leads to higher total NGO output, as the motivational composition
of the non-prot sector is unaltered. However, a large injection of foreign aid may
lead to a motivational re-composition of the non-prot sector, attracting self-interested
agents into it, and thereby leading to a decline in total non-prot output. Such non-
monotonic relation, in turn, can help explaining the micro-macro paradox observed by
empirical studies of aid effectiveness (i.e., the absence of a positive effect of aid on
output at the aggregate level, combined with numerous positive ndings at the micro
level).
Third, we analyze a number of mechanisms that might prevent the emergence of
the low-effectiveness equilibrium. From the donors’ side, if warm-glow motivation
responds positively to the expected productivity of the non-prot sector, the pure
low-effectiveness equilibrium disappears. However, our model shows that, even in
this case, when the amount of donations is sufciently large, selsh agents still end
up constituting an important share of the pool of non-prot managers, thus hurting
the aggregate provision of public goods. On the non-prots’ side, peer monitoring
mechanisms can lead to multiple equilibria. In one equilibrium, the non-prot sector
is managed by motivated agents and the quality of peer monitoring is high. In the
second equilibrium, the sector is instead managed by selsh individuals and no peer
monitoring takes place. The reason for the multiplicity of equilibria is that the quality
of monitoring is itself endogenous to the occupational choice of agents, and it improves
with the average level of motivation in the non-prot sector. Finally, we show that a
properly designed public nancing policy of the non-prot sector may improve the
motivational composition of the non-prot sector.
Besides the aforementioned papers by Andreoni (1989) and Benabou and Tirole
(2006), our paper relates to several other key papers that study theoretically the
implications of pro-social motivation for non-prot organizations: Glaeser and Shleifer
(2001), François (2003, 2007), Besley and Ghatak (2005), Lakdawalla and Philipson
(2006), and Aldashev and Verdier (2010).4 We contribute to this line of research by
endogenizing the returns of the different occupational choices available to individuals,
and by exploring the general equilibrium implications of the level of nancing of the
non-prot sector.
The second related strand of literature is the one focusing on the self-selection
of individuals into the public sector and politics: e.g., Caselli and Morelli (2004),
4. On the empirical side, Gregg et al. (2011) nd that individuals in the non-prot sector in the U.K.
are signicantly more likely to do unpaid overtime work as compared to their counterparts in the for-
prot sector. Moreover, this differential willingness remain even when the former individuals move into the
for-prot sector, strongly supporting theories based on self-selection (rather than sector-specic incentive
structure).
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Macchiavello (2008), Delfgaauw and Dur (2010), Bond and Glode (2014), Jaimovich
and Rud (2014). The insights from the theoretical research in this area, that mostly
exploits occupational-choice models, have been conrmed by recent empirical studies.
For instance, Georgellis et al. (2011) nd, using the U.K. data, that individuals are
attracted to the public sector by the intrinsic rather than the extrinsic incentives, and
that (in the higher education and health sectors) higher extrinsic rewards reduce the
propensity of intrinsically-motivated agents to enter into the public sector. We extend
this line of ongoing research by (i) analyzing how the selection mechanisms apply to
the non-prot/NGO sector within a context of endogenous voluntary donations, and
(ii) studying the effectiveness of three mechanisms that potentially can improve the
motivational selection into the non-prot sector.
Finally, there is growing literature that studies the effectiveness of different modes
and levels of foreign aid (see the survey by Bourguignon and Platteau, 2015). Among
these studies, Svensson (2000) underlines how short-term increases in aid ows may
trigger rent-seeking wars among competing elites. Another interesting contribution
is Bourguignon and Platteau (2013), which concentrates on moral hazard problems
(in particular, it studies the effect of domestic monitoring on the ultimate use of aid
ows). Our model studies a separate and novel channel: that of motivational adverse
selection into the sector that intermediates foreign aid ows between outside donors
and beneciaries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 builds our baseline model of
occupational choice in the for-prot and non-prot sectors; it also analyzes the effects
of foreign aid and public nancing on the motivational allocation in the non-prot
sector. Section 3 analyzes the functioning of three different oversight mechanisms:
conditional warm-glow of donors, peer monitoring institutions by non-prots, and tax-
nanced government grants to non-prots. Section 4 discusses the main premises and
modelling choices, as well as the generalizability of our results. Section 5 presents
case-study evidence for the mechanisms of the model. Section 6 explores several
avenues for future work, and concludes. The Appendix contains two extensions of
the basic model, as well as some of the proofs of propositions.
2. Basic Model
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of agents with unit mass. There exist
two occupational choices: an agent may become either a private entrepreneur in the
for-prot sector or a social entrepreneur by founding a rm in the non-prot sector.
Let’s denote the choice of agent i with oi 2 private; social. We refer to the two types
of rms as private and non-prot rms, respectively. Let N denote the total mass of
non-prot entrepreneurs; thus, 1 N is the mass of private entrepreneurs.
All agents are identically skilled. They differ, however, in their level of pro-social
motivation, mi , which indicates to which extent an individual is genuinely motivated
to help others (the beneciaries of her projects). There exist two levels ofmi , which we
refer to henceforth as types: mH (motivated) and mL (selsh) types, where mH D 1
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and mL D 0. A selsh type can also set up projects whose declared aim is helping
the beneciaries, but where she cares only about the aspects of these projects that
increase her own well-being (ego, perks, etc.). The type mi is private information. In
what follows, we assume that the population is equally split between mH - and mL-
types.
The utility function of an agent has the following form:
Wi D I.oi /

w
1 mi
i g
mi
i
1
m
mi
i .1 mi /1 mi

C .1  I.oi //
"
c1 ıd ı 1
ı .1  ı/1 ı
#
;
(1)
where I.oi / is the indicator function taking value 1 if oi D social .wi and c denote her
consumption in the non-prot and private sectors, respectively, whereas gi and d stand
for her warm-glow pro-social contribution in the non-prot and private sectors. Finally,
ı 2 ¹0; 1º is a parameter measuring the relative importance of giving as compared to
private consumption. The details of this structure are explained below.
2.1. For-Profit Sector
We assume that each private entrepreneur produces an identical amount of output.
There are decreasing returns in the private sector, thus while the aggregate output is
increasing in the mass of private entrepreneurs, 1   N , the output produced by each
private entrepreneur is decreasing in 1   N . More precisely, we assume that each
private entrepreneur produces
y D A
.1 N/1 ˛ , where 0 < ˛ < 1 and A > 0: (2)
Aggregate output is thus given by Y D A.1 N/˛ .5
Private-sector entrepreneurs derive utility from their own consumption (c). In
addition, they also enjoy warm-glow utility from donating to the non-prot sector (d ).
The utility Wi of a entrepreneur in the private sector then reduces to:6
Wi D VP .c; d/ D c1 ıd ı 1
ı .1  ı/1 ı , where 0 < ı < 1: (3)
5. Our assumption of decreasing marginal returns with respect to the aggregate mass of private
entrepreneurs reects the fact that, at a given point in time, there is a xed factor in the economy (which
we do not explicitly model) that enters the production of goods in the private sector.
6. In principle, it may seem more reasonable to assume that agents who exhibit a higher degree of pro-
social motivation should also be more prone to donating for social causes, and therefore display a larger
value of ı in (3). We stick to the simplest possible formulation in this basic model, to introduce in the stark
way the idea that donations are endogenous, by shutting down additional effects. In the Appendix B, we
relax the assumption that warm-glow donations by private entrepreneurs are independent of their level of
pro-social motivation by letting ı be type-specic (ıi ), with ıL D 0 and 0 < ıH  1. This introduces
the additional complexity of making donations dependent on the degree of motivational heterogeneity in
the for-prot sector, giving rise to the possibilty of multiple equilibria.
Journal of the European Economic Association
Preprint prepared on 21 June 2017 using jeea.cls v1.0.
Aldashev, Jaimovich & Verdier Motivational Allocation and Non-Prot Sector 7
Private-sector entrepreneurs maximize (3) subject to (2). This yields c D
.1  ı/ y and d D ıy, which in turn implies that, at the optimum, their indirect utility
function is equal to the income they generate as private entrepreneurs:
V P D y: (4)
From the optimization problem of private-sector entrepreneurs, it follows that the
total amount of entrepreneurial donations to the non-prot sector is
D D ı .1 N/˛ A; (5)
which increases with the productivity of the private sector (A), the number of private
rms (1 N ), and the propensity to donate out of income (ı).
2.2. Non-Profit Xector
The non-prot sector is composed by a continuum of non-prot rms with total mass
N . Each non-prot rm is run by a social entrepreneur. We think of each single non-
prot rm as a mission-oriented organization, as in Besley and Ghatak (2005), with
a narrow mission targeting one particular social problem (e.g., child malnutrition, air
pollution, ghting malaria, etc.).
Each non-prot manager i collects an amount of donations i from the aggregate
pool of donations D. The collected donations i can be allocated into two distinct
dimensions of the project. One dimension, which absorbs a level of expenses equal to
wi , does not serve the ultimate needs of the beneciaries, but might increase the well-
being of the non-prot manager. Such self-serving dimensions may include his wages,
in-kind perks such as a car with a driver, but can also be his pet projects or actions that
might increase his ego utility. The second dimension uses the undistributed donations
i  wi as an input for the production of the service towards the organization’s mission
and increases the well-being of beneciaries. We measure the effectiveness/output of
each specic non-prot rm by gi , which is a function of the undistributed donations
.i  wi /. We assume that the output generated by each specic non-prot rm exhibits
decreasing returns with respect to the funds invested into the project, namely:
gi D .i  wi / , where 0 <  < 1: (6)
An important feature of this specication is the fact that the curvature of the non-
prot sector technology is larger than that of the for-prot sector. As we will see, this
assumption underlies the single-crossing result (Lemma 1), which, in turn, allows a
simple characterization of the different types of equilibria that may arise. As we argue
more precisely in our discussion Section 4, this assumption seems reasonable in the
context of the functioning of the non-prot sector.
A non-prot manager derives utility from the two dimensions noted above. The
weight placed on each of two components of utility is given by the non-prot
manager’s level of pro-social motivation mi . The utility Wi of a non-prot manager
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with motivation mi reduces to:
Wi D Ui .wi ; gi / D w1 mii gmii
1
m
mi
i .1 mi /1 mi
, where mi 2 ¹mH ;mLº: (7)
We assume that the monitoring by donors of the non-prot sector is weak, and
donors cannot control how non-prot managers split the donations between the two
dimensions. For simplicity, we take the extreme assumption that non-prot managers
enjoy full discretion in deciding this allocation (subject to the feasibility constraint
wi  i ). In addition, we assume that the pool of total donationsD is equally shared by
all non-prot rms.7 Therefore, donations collected by each non-prot rm are given
by:
i D D
N
D ıA .1 N/
˛
N
:
Notice that i is decreasing inN through two distinct channels. Firstly, because the
level of aggregate donationsD shrinks when the mass of private entrepreneurs .1 N/
gets smaller. Secondly, because a rise in the mass of non-prot rms N means that a
given total pool of donationsD must be split among a larger mass of non-prot rms.
Given that mH D 1, motivated non-prot managers place all the weight in their
utility function on the dimension that helps the beneciaries g, and set accordingly
wH D 0. As a result, choosing to become a non-prot manager gives to a motivated
agent the indirect utility equal to
U H D

D
N

D

ıA
.1 N/˛
N

: (8)
Analogously, given that mL D 0, selsh non-prot managers disregard
contributing to their organizations’ mission, and allocate all the donations to the self-
serving (unproductive) dimension, wL D i . This implies that choosing to become a
non-prot manager gives to a selfish agent the level of utility
U L D
D
N
D ıA.1 N/
˛
N
: (9)
We can now state the following single-crossing result:
Lemma 1. Let yN denote the level of N at which D. yN/ D yN . Then,
U H R U L if and only if N R yN I
where, (i) ıA=.1C ıA/ < yN < 1, (ii) yN is strictly increasing in A and ı, and strictly
decreasing in ˛, (iii) lim
A!1
yN D 1, (iv) lim
˛!0
yN D ıA and lim
˛!1
yN D ıA=.1C ıA/.
7. Appendix A presents a model that relaxes the equal-sharing assumption by endogenizing fundraising
effort.
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Lemma 1 states that a motivated individual obtains higher utility from becoming
a non-prot manager, as compared to a selsh individual making the same choice,
only when donations per non-prot are small enough, i.e. D=N < 1. Both U H and
U L are strictly increasing in donations per non-prot, D=N . However, when the level
of donations received by each non-prot rises above a certain threshold (which here
is equal to 1), U L surpasses U H . The reason for this result essentially rests on the
concavity of gi in (6), combined with the altruism displayed by motivated non-prot
managers in (7). These two features translate into a payoff function of motivated non-
prot managers, U H , that is concave inD=N . Conversely, selsh non-prot managers
exhibit a payoff function, U L , which is linear in D=N . This is because these agents
only care about their perks or pet projects, and hence they exploit the lack of monitoring
in the NGO sector in order to always set wi D D=N .
2.3. Equilibrium Occupational Choice
Let NH and NL denote henceforth the mass of non-prot managers of mH - and mL-
type, respectively (the total mass of non-prot managers is then N D NH CNL). In
equilibrium, the following two conditions must be simultaneously satised:
1. Given the values of NH and NL, each individual chooses the occupation that
yields the higher level of utility, with some agents possibly indifferent between
occupations.
2. The allocation .NH ;NL/ must be feasible: .NH ;NL/ 2 Œ0; 1=2  Œ0; 1=2.
In this basic specication of the model, for a given parametric conguration, the
equilibrium occupational choice will always be unique (except for one knife-edge case
described in the next footnote). Nevertheless, the type of agents (in terms of their
pro-social motivation) who self-select into the non-prot sector will depend on the
specic parametric conguration of the model. In what follows, we describe the main
features of the two broad kinds of equilibria that may take place: an equilibrium where
0 D NH < NL D N (which we refer to as low-effectiveness or L-equilibrium), and
an equilibrium where 0 D NL < NH D N (which we dub as high-effectiveness of
H-equilibrium).8
L-equilibrium. In a ‘low-effectiveness equilibrium’ the non-prot sector is populated
exclusively by selsh individuals, and arises when payoffs are such that: U H .N / <
V P .N /  U L .N /, where V P .N / is given by (4), U H .N / by (8), U L .N / by (9), and
N D NL  1=2.
8. These two cases exclude the set of parametric congurations for which yN DN0, whereN0 is dened
below in (10). When yN DN0, all individuals in the economy will be indifferent in equilibrium across the
two occupations. Moreover, because of that, there is actually equilibrium multiplicity, and the set equilibria
is given by
®
N
H
CN
L
D N0;
ˇˇ
0  N
H
 1=2;0  N
L
 1=2¯. Hereafter, for the sake of brevity,
we skip this knife-edge case:
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Lemma 1 implies that forU H .N / < U L .N / to hold, the number of non-prot rms
should be sufciently small (i.e.,N < yN ), so that the donations received by each non-
prot rm turn out to be sufciently large. In addition, the condition V P .N /  U L .N /
leads to:
N  N0  ı
1C ı : (10)
From (10) we may observe that N0 < 1=2. As a result, in a low-effectiveness
equilibrium it must necessarily be the case thatN DNL DN0, so that the selsh agents
turn out to be indifferent between the for-prot and non-prot sectors. Indifference by
mL-types leads a mass 1=2  N0 of them to become private entrepreneurs, allowing
thus "markets" to clear. Notice, nally, that U H .N0/ < V P .N0/ needs to be satised,
hence the crucial parametric condition leading to an L-equilibrium boils down to
N0 < yN .
H-equilibrium. This type of equilibrium takes place when all selsh individuals
prefer to found private rms, whereas all motivated ones prefer (weakly) to be social
entrepreneurs: U L .N / < V P .N /  U H .N /, where N D NH  1=2.
Lemma 1 states that for U H .N / > U L .N / to hold, the non-prot sector should
have a sufciently large number of non-prot rms:N > yN . The condition U L .N / <
V P .N / requires that N > N0. Unlike the previous case, in the high-effectiveness
equilibrium one cannot rule out the possibility of full sectorial specialization of the
two motivational types of agents (i.e., in principle, an H-equilibrium may well feature
NL D 0 and NH D 1=2).
For future reference, we denote with N1 the value of N that makes mH -types
indifferent between occupations. From (2) and (8) we can observe thatN1 is implicitly
dened by:
.1 N1/
1 ˛.1 /

N1
 A
1 

ı
: (11)
Equilibrium Characterization. The following proposition characterizes the different
kinds of equilibria that may arise, given the specic parametric conguration of the
model.
Proposition 1. Whenever A.1C ı/1 ˛ ¤ 1 the equilibrium is unique. When
A.1C ı/1 ˛ > 1 the economy is in an L-equilibrium, whereas whenA.1C ı/1 ˛ < 1
the economy is in an H-equilibrium. More formally:
1. Low-Effectiveness Equilibrium: if A.1C ı/1 ˛ > 1, in equilibrium, there is a
mass N  D N L D N0 of non-profit firms all managed by mL-types. The mass of
private entrepreneurs is equal to 1 N0; among these a mass 1=2 are mH -types
and a mass 1=2 N0 are mL-types.
2. High-Effectiveness Equilibrium: if A.1C ı/1 ˛ < 1, in equilibrium, there is a
mass N  D N H D min ¹N1; 1=2º of non-profit firms all managed by mH -types.
The mass of private entrepreneurs is equal to max ¹1 N1; 1=2º; among these a
mass 1=2 are mL-types and a mass max ¹0; 1=2 N1º are mH -types.
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Proposition 1 characterizes the main types of equilibria that may arise in the model.
These cases are depicted in Figure 1(a)–(c) (panels A, B, and C). This gure portrays
the indirect utilities of motivated and selsh agents in the non-prot sector (UH andUL,
respectively) and that of individuals in the private sector (y), all of them as functions
of the size of the non-prot sector, N .
An implication of Proposition 1 is that more productive economies (i.e., those with
a relatively large A) tend to exhibit a low-effectiveness equilibrium. This result rests
on the fact that a larger A entails greater prots to private entrepreneurs. Hence, in
equilibrium, a larger amount of donations to any non-prot rm (i ) are needed in
order to compensate for the higher opportunity cost of managing a non-prot rm
(i.e., the fact of not becoming a private entrepreneur). In turn, when i is larger, the
scope for rent-seeking in the non-prot sector is greater, which attracts more intensely
selsh agents than motivated ones. A similar intuition applies to the effect of a higher
warm-glow utility from giving; that is, a greater ı. This yields a larger amount of total
donations,D, for a given mass of non-protsN , making the non-prot sector relatively
more attractive to selsh agents than to motivated ones.9
2.4. Effect of Foreign Aid on the Equilibrium Allocation
So far, all donations in our model were generated (endogenously) within the economy.
However, in the context of developing economies, foreign aid represents also a major
source of revenue for non-prots organizations. In fact, an ever growing share of
foreign aid is being channeled via NGOs. For instance, McCleary and Barro (2008)
show that over 40% of U.S. overseas development funds ows through NGOs.
International aid agencies have been increasingly choosing NGOs over public-sector
channels as well: e.g., whereas between 1973 and 1988, only 6% of World Bank
projects went through NGOs, by 1994 this share exceeded 50% (Hudock, 1999).10
What would be the effect of a rise in foreign aid on the motivational composition
and performance of the non-prot sector of the recipient economy? In this subsection,
we analyze this question by slightly modifying the above model to allow for an
injection  > 0 of foreign aid into the economy.
Foreign aid represents an exogenous increase in the total amount of donations
available to the national non-prot sector. Donations collected by a non-prot rm
now become:
D
N
D ıA .1 N/
˛ C
N
: (12)
9. It is important to mention that these results entail that, as the scale of the donations market increases,
it may then become socially desirable to invest in certain types of changes in the organization of the NGO
sector that help mitigating rent-seeking behaviors, such as better accounting and monitoring mechanism,
tougher certication schemes, etc.
10. Kanbur (2006) argues that the rise of NGOs during the 1980s was one of the key changes in the
functioning of the foreign aid sector.
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t Sector 12Figure	1A.	Low-eﬀec1veness	equilibrium	
(a) Low-effectiveness equilibrium.
Figure	1B.	High-eﬀec1veness	equilibrium	with	
incomplete	sor1ng	
(b) High-effectiveness equilibrium with incomplete sorting.Figure	1C.	High-eﬀec1veness	equilibrium	with		
full	sor1ng	
(c) High-effectiveness equilibrium with full sorting.
Figure 1
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As done above in Lemma 1, we rst pin down the threshold yN such that, for all
N > yN the utility obtained by selsh non-prot managers dominates that obtained by
motivated non-prot managers.
Lemma 2. (i) Whenever 0    1, there exists a threshold yN  1 such that
U H .N / R U L .N / iff N R yN ; the threshold yN is strictly increasing in , and
lim!1 yN D 1. (ii) Whenever  > 1, U H .N / < U L .N / for all 0 < N  1.
The rst result in Lemma 2 essentially says that the set of values ofN for which the
inequality U H .N / < U L .N / holds –which is given by the interval .0; yN/– expands as
the amount of foreign aid  increases. The second result states that when foreign aid
is sufciently large, U H .N / < U L .N / becomes valid for any feasible value of N .
The injection of foreign aid thus enlarges the set of parameters under which the
economy features an equilibrium with selsh non-prot managers (‘L-equilibrium’).
The proposition below formalizes this perverse effect of foreign aid. For brevity, we
restrict the analysis only to the more interesting case, in which A.1C ı/1 ˛ < 1.
For future reference, it proves useful to denote byN the level ofN for which y.N /
in (2) equals one; that is,
N  1 A 11 ˛ : (13)
In addition, in order to disregard situations in whichN  0 fails to exist, we henceforth
set the following upper-bound on A:
Assumption 1. A  1.
Note that if A > 1, then the condition A.1C ı/1 ˛ < 1 for an ‘H-equilibrium’ in
Proposition 1 could never hold, and the model would always deliver – by construction
– an ‘L-equilibrium’.11
Proposition 2. Consider an economy where 2 .1 ˛/ < A < .1C ı/ .1 ˛/. In these
cases, the fraction of motivated non-profit managers will depend non-monotonically on
the level of foreign aid. More precisely, by defining 0  1 A1=1 ˛ .1C ı/, where
notice that 0 > 0, then:
1. When 0   < 0, all non-profit firms are managed by mH -types.
2. There exists a finite threshold A > 0 such that, when 0 <   A, all
non-profit firms are managed by mL-types.
3. When  > A, non-profit firms are managed by a mix of types, with mL-type
majority. In particular, there is a mass N L D 1=2 of selfish non-profit managers
11. Another way to avoid this problem would be to assume that the production function of private
entrepreneurs is given by y.N/, with y0.N/ > 0; y00.N/ < 0, y.1/D1 and y.0/D 0. Note that all
these properties are satised by (2), except for y.0/ D 0. Intuitively, what is needed to give room for an
‘H-equilibrium’ is that y.N/  1 for someN  0. Assumption 1 ensures this is always the case.
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and a mass 0 < N H < 1=2 of motivated managers, whereN H is strictly increasing
in .
Proposition 2 describes the effects of changes in the amount of foreign aid on the
equilibrium allocation of an economy which, in the absence of any foreign donations,
would display a high-effectiveness equilibrium. The proposition focuses on the case
whereA.1C ı/1 ˛ < 1, but 21 ˛A > 1, which illustrates the non-monotonic effect of
foreign aid on motivational composition in the non-prot sector in the cleanest possible
way. However, in the Appendix C we show that analogous results also arise for the case
when 21 ˛A < 1 (see Proposition 2(bis) therein)12.
According to Proposition 2, when foreign aid is not too large ( < 0), the
non-prot sector remains managed by motivated agents. However, when the level
of donations surpasses the threshold 0, selsh agents start being attracted into the
non-prot sector due to the greater scope for rent extraction. Interestingly, for any
0 <   A, the economy experiences a complete reversal in the equilibrium
occupational choice: allmH -types choose the private sector, while the non-prot sector
becomes entirely managed by mL-types. Finally, when  > A, foreign aid becomes
so large that the non-prot sector starts attracting back some of themH -types in order to
equalize the returns of motivated agents in the for-prot and non-prot sectors. Notice,
however, that when > A the mass of non-prots run by selsh agents is still larger
than the mass of non-prots managed by mH -types.
Figure 2 depicts the above-mentioned results. The solid lines represent U H .N /
and U L .N / when  D 0 , the dashed lines shows non-prot managers’ payoffs
when 0 <   A, and the dotted lines plots those payoffs when  > A. A
gradual injection of foreign aid from  D 0 to  D 0 initially has no effect on the
motivational composition of the non-prot sector. Beyond the amount of aid  D 0
the motivational composition of the non-prot sector is completely reversed. Further
increases in foreign aid have no effect on the non-prot sector’s output, up to the point
 D A. There, all the unmotivated agents have moved into the non-prot sector
and thus its size equals 1=2. From then on, further injections of aid (beyond A) start
to attract back some motivated agents into the non-prot sector, and the motivational
composition of the sector therefore improves.
A key corollary that stems from Proposition 2 refers to the total output of the
non-prot sector, G, at different values of . Bearing in mind that only motivated
non-prot managers devote the donations collected to the dimension that produces the
mission-oriented output gi (and, thus, contributes to the well-being of beneciaries),
an implication of Proposition 2 is that G./ is non-monotonic in . In particular,
non-prot output grows initially with the amount of foreign aid, up to the level when
12. The only major qualitative difference is that when 21 ˛A < 1 the ‘L-equilibrium’ where all non-
prot rms are managed bymL-types will no longer arise. Instead, when 21 ˛A< 1, while the economy
still exhibits an ‘H-equilibrium’ for levels of that are sufciently low, beyond a certain threshold of the
economy switches directly to a mixed-type equilibrium. In that respect, the fraction of motivated non-prot
managers will still depend non-monotonically on the level of foreign aid when 21 ˛A < 1.
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Figure	2.	Eﬀect	of	foreign	aid	injec1on	
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Figure 2. Effect of foreign aid injection.
 D 0 when it reaches G.0/ D N , which is the enhancing effect of foreign
donations when the non-prots are managed by motivated managers. However, for
0 <   A, the motivation in the non-prot sector gets completely "polluted"
by the presence of selsh managers, and G./ drops suddenly to zero. Finally, when
foreign donations rise beyondA, non-prot output begins to grow again (starting off
from G D 0), as some of the donations will end up in the hands of mH -types. This
non-monotonicity of the total output of the non-prot sector is depicted by Figure 3.
Note that our mechanism is quite different from the several arguments previously
raised concerning the perverse effects of foreign aid on the functioning of the public
sector.13 In fact, our model shows that even when foreign aid is channeled through
the NGO sector (hence, by-passing the public bureaucracy) perverse effects might still
arise, since massive aid inows may end up worsening the motivational composition
of the NGO sector in the recipient country.
Our results may also help shedding light on the so-called micro-macro paradox
found in the empirical foreign aid literature; e.g., Mosley (1986). On the one hand,
at the microeconomic level, there are numerous studies that nd the positive effect of
foreign-aid nanced projects on measures of welfare of beneciaries. On the other
hand, at the aggregate level most studies actually fail to nd a signicant positive
effect. Our model rationalizes this paradox as follows: when aid inows are small (or,
alternatively, when you hold the motivational composition of the NGO sector constant)
13. For example, Svensson (2000) suggests that foreign aid channelled through the public sector may
lead to higher bureaucratic corruption, break-up of accountability mechanisms of elected ofcials, and the
ignition of ethnic-based rent-seeking behavior.
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Figure	3.	Foreign	aid	and	non-proﬁt	sector	output	
Figure 3. Foreign aid and non-prot sector output.
the general equilibrium effect becomes negligible, and one may well nd a positive
effect of aid projects. However, when aid inows are sufciently large (e.g. when the
well-functioning micro-level projects are scaled up), the general equilibrium effects
kick in, and the motivational adverse selection effect may neutralize the positive effect
found at the micro level.
3. Eliminating Low-effectiveness Equilibrium
The analysis of the previous section raises a natural question: Can the low-effectiveness
equilibrium be avoided? If so, through which channels? In this section, we explore
three possible safeguard mechanisms that might prevent this equilibrium from
emerging. The rst focuses on the donors’ behavior and relaxes the assumption of
donors being completely unaware of the motivational problems in the non-prot sector.
The second exploits the idea that managers in the non-prot sector might have an
informational advantage about the quality of the sector’s output and thus there may
be scope for creating non-prot watchdog organizations. Finally, the third focuses on
government policies, in particular on taxes and public nancing of the non-prot sector.
3.1. Donors’ Preferences: Conditional Warm Glow
So far, we have assumed that entrepreneurs donate a fraction of their income simply
because they enjoy the act of giving. Such disconnection between donations and their
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use may sound a bit too extreme. One may expect that motivated entrepreneurs will be
unwilling to donate money when the non-prot sector is entirely run by selsh types.14
In this subsection, we relax the assumption of fully naive warm-glow giving by
motivated entrepreneurs. In particular, we modify the basic model presented in Section
2 in two ways. First, we let the propensity to donate be type-specic (ıi ) and increasing
in mi . More precisely, assume that ıi D ıH 2 .0; 1 when mi D mH , whereas
ıi D ıL D 0 whenmi D mL. Second, we let warm-glow weight rise with the fraction
of motivated non-prot managers, by postulating that mH -type private entrepreneurs
have the following utility function:
VH .c; d/ D
h Qı QıHH .1  QıH /1 QıH i 1 c1 QıH d QıH ;
where QıH D f ıH and f  NH
NH CNL : (14)
The utility function (14) displays conditional warm glow altruism, in the sense that
the intensity of the warm-glow weight ( QıH ) is linked to the likelihood that the donation
ends up in the hands of a motivated non-prot manager.
When pro-socially motivated private entrepreneurs are characterized by (14), the
level of donations obtained by a non-prot rm will be given by:
D
N
D ıH A
 
1
2
 NH

NH
.1 NH  NL/1 ˛ .NH CNL/2
: (15)
Proposition 3. Let the warm-glow weight be given by Qıi D f ıi , where ıH 2 .0; 1,
ıL D 0 and f  NH= .NH CNL/. Then, defining ƒ  Œ.2C ıH / = .2C 2ıH /1 ˛:
1. If A  ƒ, in equilibrium, N H D H .A/ and N L D 0, where @H=@A < 0.
2. If ƒ < A  1, in equilibrium, 0 < N H < 12 and 0 < N L < 12 , with
N H C N L D

1 A1=.1 ˛/. In particular, N H D nH .A/ and N L D nL.A/,
where:
nH .A/ D 1
4
 
s
1
16
 

1 A1=.1 ˛/2
ıH
,
nL.A/ D
h
1 A1=.1 ˛/
i
  nH :
Moreover, the fraction of motivated non-profit managers decreases with A,
@f=@A < 0.
14. In a recent study, Metzger and Günther (2015) test, in a laboratory experiment, whether private donors
seek information, before giving, about the impact of their donations to international NGOs. Interestingly,
they nd that only a small fraction of donors makes a well-informed donation decision and that demand
for information mostly concerns the recipient type (and not the impact of donation). They also nd that the
information about the impact of donations does not change average donation size.
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Proposition 3 states that when warm glow weights depend on the fraction of
motivated agents within the pool of non-prot managers, the purely low-effectiveness
equilibrium ceases to exist. The responsiveness of QıH to f in (14) counterbalances
the effect that a larger mass of mH -type entrepreneurs has on total donations, and
thus neutralizes the source of interaction that leads to the rise of L-equilibrium.
In other words, conditional warm glow altruism removes the possibility that the
non-prot sector is managed fully by selsh agents, since in those cases motivated
private entrepreneurs would refrain from donating any of their income. Nevertheless,
conditional warm glow altruism does not preclude the fact that the non-prot sector
may end up being partly managed by mL-types. This occurs when A is sufciently
large, which is in line again with the results of the baseline model in Proposition 1.
Furthermore, Proposition 3 shows that the fraction of selsh non-prot managers is
monotonically increasing in A.
3.2. Non-profits: Peer Monitoring by Watchdog Organizations
Our benchmark model assumed that non-prot managers are able to divert any amount
of funds they receive away from the dimension that actually helps the ultimate
beneciaries. This crude assumption intends to reect the idea that monitoring the
behavior of non-prot managers (or knowing their intrinsic motivation) is an inherently
difcult task for donors. In real life, cognizant of such pitfalls (and to ensure the
credibility of the sector as a whole), non-prots that care about the collective reputation
of the sector often try to create peer-monitoring institutions, so as to discourage
misbehavior within the sector. This is especially the case in developed economies,
and examples of such institutions are the CFB quality label in the Netherlands
and the Fundraising Standards Board in Britain; see Similon (2015) for a detailed
description).15 In this section, we explore the consequences of peer-monitoring in
the non-prot sector on the equilibrium occupational choices of motivated and selsh
agents.
To incorporate peer-monitoring, we now assume that, after the decision by each
non-prot manager of how to split donations between the two dimensions (i.e. pro-
beneciary and perks), each non-prot gets randomly matched together with another
non-prot. During this matching process, they may get to know each other’s accounts.
In particular, with probability 0 <  < 1, a non-prot observes the budget structure
of its matching partner. We assume that only the motivated non-prot managers care
about the governance structure of their sector. Thus, if they realize that their matching
partner has been diverting funds for perks or allocating the funds to projects useless
for beneciaries, they will make this information public. Publicizing this information
leads to a penalty  > 0 for the selsh agent ( can reect a reputation cost, disutility
15. In some sense, the model developed in Section 2 could then be thought as more appropriate for
underdeveloped and middle-income economies, where watchdog organizations are less present.
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related to public shaming, or the cost of legal punishment meted out to the selsh non-
prot manager).
With these assumptions, the expected utility of a selfish non-prot manager
becomes
U L .N;NH / D
D
N
  NH
N
 D ıA.1 N/
˛
N
  NH
N
: (16)
The second term in (16) reects the fact that, when a selsh non-prot manager is
matched with a motivated one (with occurs with probability NH=N ), he suffers a loss
equal to  with probability . Regarding motivated non-prot managers, given that
the matching process does not affect them, their indirect utility in the non-prot sector
remains as described by equation (8).16
This formulation intends to capture a number of relevant features of the monitoring
aspect of the development non-prot sector. First, on the motivational side, motivated
agents clearly have an intrinsic motivation to also care about the public-good nature
of having a well-functioning non-prot sector. Relatedly, they may as well feel
concerned about the general reputation of the sector.17 Second, in terms of information
acquisition, because of contacts and information-sharing between different NGOs on
the terrain and operations (Meyer 1997), insiders are more likely to have access to
information about the behavior of other members of the non-for-prot sector.
The fact that the expected utility of selsh non-prot managers in (16) is decreasing
in the share of motivated managers opens up the possibility of multiple equilibria.
Intuitively, a non-prot sector that is mainly run by intrinsically motivated agents
enjoys also high levels of monitoring and sanctioning of misbehavior in the sector.
This, in turn, discourages selsh agents from entering the non-prot sector as they
expect a low probability of success in their intended diversion of funds. Conversely,
when the non-prot sector is relatively poor in terms of motivation, selsh agents
feel more attracted to it given the larger scope for successful rent extraction that poor
monitoring allows. The next proposition fully characterizes the possible motivational
equilibrium allocations in the non-prot sector under the possibility of peer monitoring.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium allocation of motivation in the non-profit sector with
peer-monitoring non-profits depends on the parametric configuration in the following
way:
1. If A.1C ı/1 ˛ > 1, there exists a threshold value xˆ > 0 of the expected cost of
monitoring  such that:
(a) If  < xˆ , only the ‘L-equilibrium’ prevails (with N  D N0 D N L < 1=2).
(b) If  > xˆ , the model exhibits multiple equilibria with three possible
equilibrium outcomes: (i) an ‘L-equilibrium’ (with N  D N0 D N L < 1=2), (ii)
16. Motivated agents do not report anything in these matches while selsh agents do not care about
reporting. We disregard the unplausible case where selsh agents would make false reports concerning
motivated agents, which seems rather far-fetched.
17. One could also rationalize these reputational concers from a dynamic perspective as ensuring that the
sector maintains its credibility vis-a-vis the donors.
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an ‘H-equilibrium’ (withN  DN1 DN H < 1=2/, (iii) a ‘mixed-type equilibrium’
(with N  D N1 D N H CN L < 1=2 and N H and N L > 0).
2. If A.1C ı/1 ˛ < 1, only the ‘H-equilibrium’ prevails (with N  D N H D
min ¹N1; 1=2º/.
It is interesting to compare the above results to those in Proposition 1. When
 > xˆ (that is, when the expected punishment upon detection is high enough), peer
monitoring by motivated agents in the non-prot sector allows the possibility of a high-
effectiveness equilibrium whenA.1C ı/1 ˛ > 1. These are parameter congurations
that led to an ‘L-equilibrium’ as a unique equilibrium in Proposition 1. However, peer
monitoring by non-prot managers does not ensure that such improved motivational
allocation will necessarily emerge when A.1C ı/1 ˛ > 1. In fact, multiple equilibria
are possible in that range. The reason for this is that the quality of monitoring is
itself endogenous to the occupational choice of agents. This negative externality from
motivated non-prot managers to selsh ones naturally creates a scope for expectation-
driven multiple equilibria.18
3.3. Policies: Taxes and Public Financing of Non-profit Sector
In most economies, an important part of non-prots’ revenues comes from public
grants nanced by taxes. This raises two main questions. First, what is the effect of
partial public nancing on the motivational composition and size of the non-prot
sector? Second, can public nancing generate an improvement in the composition of
the non-prot sector, as compared to the decentralized equilibrium? In this section, we
address these questions by adding a set of public policy variables into our basic model.
We let the government impose a proportional tax on income in the for-prot sector
and use its proceeds to distribute (unconditional) grants to non-prot rms. Thus, the
payoffs of individuals in the private sector now becomes
V P D .1  t / y; (17)
where y is still given by (2). The level of donations collected by each non-prot in this
case are equal to
i D D
N
D
private donations‚ …„ ƒ
ı .1  t / .1 N/y C
public grant‚ …„ ƒ
t .1 N/y
N
: (18)
Public nancing via such a tax/grant system alters occupational choices of
individuals via two distinct channels. First, we can see in (17) that taxation lowers
18. Notice that the multiplicity of equilibria hinges crucially on the fact that selsh non-prot managers
do not care about reporting of misbehavior by their peers. One solution to this problem could then be
(monetarily) rewarding whistleblowing, so as to induce also selsh non-prot managers to report rent-
seeking.
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Figure 4. Public nancing of non-prot sector.
returns in the private sector. Second, since the public sector distributes back all the taxes
it collects while the private sector only gives a fraction ı of its net income, i in (18)
increases with the tax rate t . Both channels, ceteris paribus, turn the non-prot sector
more attractive to all individuals. However, within our general equilibrium framework,
the key issue is whether public nancing increases the attractiveness of the non-prot
sector relatively more for motivated or for selsh individuals.
To study the more interesting case, let us focus on a setting where our basic
economy (without public nancing) would give rise to a low-effectiveness equilibrium:
A.1C ı/1 ˛ > 1.
Consider now an increase in taxes, with the transfer of all the proceeds to non-
prots as grants. For such policy to induce a motivational improvement in the non-
prot sector, it is crucial that, in the new equilibrium (after taxes), the selsh individuals
who were initially managing the non-prot sector switch occupations and move to the
private sector. This will occur only if the policy attracts enough motivated agents from
the private sector into the non-prot sector, so that this entry sufciently dilutes the
amount of funds per non-prot organization, even after taking into account the larger
total funding of the non-prot sector as a whole. The proposition below formally proves
that such a tax/grant policy exists.
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Proposition 5. For A.1C ı/1 ˛ D 1C ", where 0 < " < N", there exist a feasible
range of tax rates ŒNt;
Nt , where Nt > 0 and
Nt  .1  ı/=.2  ı/, such that when t 2 ŒNt;
Nt 
an ‘H-equilibrium’ arises.
Figure 4 plots the equilibrium regions for different combinations of values of A
and t (see Appendix C for the derivation of the equilibrium regions). There are four
different regions. For combinations of relatively low values of A and t , the model
features an ‘H-equilibrium’ where the non-prot sector is fully managed by motivated
agents. On the other hand, given a certain level of t , for sufciently high levels of
A we have an ‘L-equilibrium’. Notice that when t D 0, the boundary between these
two regions is given by A D 1=.1C ı/1 ˛ , as previously stated in Proposition 1. In
addition, with public nancing, two new equilibrium regions arise: one with a mixed-
type equilibrium with a fraction of motivated agents in the non-prot sector larger than
one half .f > 0:5/, and one with a mixed-type equilibrium with f < 0:5. These two
types of equilibria occur when the tax rate is sufciently large, while the former also
requires that A is sufciently small and the latter that A takes intermediate values.
A crucial feature of Figure 4 is that the threshold level of A splitting the high-
effectiveness and low-effectiveness equilibrium regions is increasing in t (up to the
point in which t D Nt ). As a consequence of this, there are situations in which
introducing public funding of non-prots via (higher) taxes on private incomes can
make the economy switch from an ‘L-equilibrium’ to an ‘H-equilibrium’. This is
depicted in Figure 4 by the dashed line arrow.
This result rests on a subtle general equilibrium interaction. Consider an economy
with no taxes that is on the low-effectiveness equilibrium region, located at point Z.
At Z, all mH -types prefer the private sector, while mL-types are indifferent between
both sectors.19 Since a higher tax rate makes the non-prot sector more attractive, by
sufciently raising t we can makemH -types prefer non-prot sector as well. However,
when all motivated agents switch to the non-prot sector, the value of N will rise and
the returns in this sector will accordingly decrease. When t lies within the interval
ŒNt;
Nt , the new equilibrium allocation induced by the higher t leads to an increase in
total funding of the non-prot sector, while simultaneously reducing the value of per-
organization funding (i ) enough so that only motivated agents are ultimately attracted
to the non-prot sector.20
In terms of actual implementation, our result implies that it may be advisable to
give starting grants to new non-prots. For instance, consider the recent proposals to
do "philanthropy through privatization" (Salamon, 2013), which consists in returning
part of proceeds from the privatization of public sector assets to foundations and
19. Hence, atZ, one part of themL-types choose the private sector and the other part choose non-prot
rms.
20. Notice that all this implies that, in the new equilibrium, the total mass of non-prot rms must
necessarily be larger than in Z, since from (18) it follows that i will grow with t for a given level of
N . In other words, after t is raised to a level within ŒNt; Nt, a mass N

L
of selsh non-prot managers will
be replaced by a massN
H
of motivated non-prot managers, whereN
H
> N
L
.
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charities. Our analysis suggests that this policy would work correctly only if the way
these proceeds are used is such that they are scattered through a multitude of small
organizations, rather than concentrating them on a few large non-prots. In fact, while
the latter risks worsening the motivational composition of the sector by attracting
selsh agents, the former ensures that the returns in the non-prot sector remain low
enough to attract only motivated managers.
4. Discussion
In this section, we proceed to discuss some of the key assumptions and modelling
choices of our baseline framework. We also provide some discussion regarding the
robustness of our results to relaxing these assumptions.
4.1. Decreasing Returns in the Non-profit Sector
One key assumption is the decreasing returns in the non-prot sector (0 <  < 1).21
This assumption underlies the single-crossing result (Lemma 1), which is, in turn,
crucial for characterizing the different types of equilibria that may arise (Proposition
1). The nature of the functioning of the non-prot sector makes this assumption seem
appropriate in the context of our model. Two distinct reasons motivate our choice
of decreasing returns at the level of single non-prot organizations: i) the fact that
motivated agents may become a scarce input unable to grow at the same speed as
donations ; ii) the fact that non-prots tend to face increasingly difcult tasks to
accomplish as their effort within their mission boundaries deepens.
Non-prot organizations are entities crucially dened by their missions (that is, the
specic social problems that these organizations aim to address). A fundamental scarce
resource from the viewpoint of these organizations is then mission-oriented motivated
labor, i.e. individuals who are aligned with the mission of a particular non-prot.22 The
practitioners of the sector, in fact, underline that nding such people and expanding the
staff of the organization is often extremely difcult, mainly because of the existing
variety of missions and organizations.23 In this respect, a fundamental operational
difference between non-prot and for-prot rms is that, while (individually) the latter
can easily purchase the required inputs in the market at the given market price, the
former tends to face an often binding constraint on the amount of ‘mission-oriented
motivation’ it can acquire. Thus, as funding expands, if the non-prot motivated
21. This assumption is dispensed, though, in the model presented in the Appendix A, where we use a
linear production function for each single non-prot rm.
22. Although our model has treated pro-socially motivated agents as identical (hence, without displaying
heterogeneity in their type of pro-social motivation), the idea that each NGO manager operates a different
non-prot rm implicitly reects the underlying notion that motivated agents also differ in the social
mission they most strongly align with.
23. This has also been highlighted by the matching-to-mission model of Besley and Ghatak (2005).
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labor cannot grow at the same pace, some form of diminishing returns of those
funds will eventually kick in. For instance, Robinson (1992, p. 38) notes about
non-prots working in rural areas that "ambitious attempts to expand or replicate
successful projects can founder on the paucity of appropriately trained personnel who
are experienced in community development". Similarly, Hodson (1992) states that
"Upgrading the management capability [of a development non-prot] usually implies new
talent. Unfortunately, the story-book scenario under which the original team continues to
develop its management capability at a rate sufcient to cope with rapid growth rarely
comes true..." (p. 132)
Concerning the second reason that motivates our assumption, the type of tasks that
a non-prot organization typically carries out tends to change along its expansion path.
The rst activities tend to concentrate on some form of emergency: saving individuals
from imminent physical danger or starvation, helping to avoid some irreversible
health problem, etc. In this sense, the marginal returns are extremely high at the
beginning. However, the next activities of the non-prot’s project involve usually tasks
which are less emergency-driven and more oriented towards making the livelihoods of
beneciaries sustainable (e.g. putting children to school, providing economic activities
so that beneciaries can earn their living). Smillie (1995) argues that these types of
tasks are much harder to accomplish successfully and involve a much longer period of
time to realize. Such long-run perspective also implies that many organizations prefer
to concentrate on the emergencies; however, the resulting competition among them for
"saving lives" limits their expansion, as has been underlined by observers of large-scale
humanitarian emergencies such as the 2004 tsunami (Mattei, 2005). In our case, this
implies that, for a given non-prot organization, the slope of its production function
is fairly steep at low levels of funding (when it rst deals with emergency activities),
while becomes atter at higher levels of funding (as the non-prot moves its focus to
sustainable development activities).
4.2. Informational Asymmetries and Lack of Contractibility
Throughout the paper we have assumed that motives for giving are unrelated to
the performance of non-prot rms.24 This assumption would become untenable if
motivated non-prot managers could nd a way to signal their motivation to donors.
One possibility for such signalling would result from allowing non-prot managers to
"burn money". In such case, a separating equilibrium where motivated types engage
in "burning" enough money (so as to discourage self-interested types from joining
the non-prot sector) could arise. It is hard to envision, however, a practical way of
carrying out these sort of actions. One possibility could be allowing for self-imposed
24. Note, however, that Section 3.1 deals with the case where donations respond to the average motivation
in the non-prot sector, but the level of donations received by each non-prot there is still assumed to be
proportional to aggregate donations.
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restrictions on overheads. Yet, to be credible, such a scheme would require a third-
party certication of such restrictions (for example, by the government, bringing up
additional credibility issues to the model.25
More generally, our model has implicitly assumed that non-prots’ output is
completely unobservable or unveriable. This assumption underlies the severe non-
contractability of managers’ allocation decisions in the non-prot sector. Non-
contractability problems means that motivation serves as a substitute for contracts in
our model, as it is exactly this problem that attracts selsh individuals into non-prots
when this sector is ooded with large amounts of donations. Clearly, some degree
of output measurability would ease the problem of adverse selection. However, it is
exactly those sectors where output is poorly measured where the role of non-prots is
greater, as has been argued by Glaeser and Shleifer (2001). In fact, in sectors where
output can be measured relatively well the production could be fully taken care of by
for-prot rms.
4.3. Absence of Non-pecuniary Incentives
Our model assumed away any form of non-pecuniary incentives, such as those that
have been studied in the organizational economics literature (Besley and Ghatak, 2008;
Bradler et al., 2015). This seems quite relevant in our context, since non-pecuniary
incentives could well be heterogeneously valued by agents with different levels of
intrinsic motivation. If social prestige associated with working in the non-prot sector
is valued relatively more by motivated types (for example, because altruistic agents
care more about the social signalling built around contributing to the production of
public goods) this would enlarge the range of parameters displaying an H-equilibrium.
However, it could be that social prestige is valued more strongly by self-interested
agents (if there are large indirect pecuniary benets that social prestige can deliver), and
the range of parameters with an H-equilibrium would thus shrink. Lastly, there could
also be non-pecuniary externalities associated to the presence of monetary rewards, as
those in Benabou and Tirole (2006); when this is the case, large scope for earnings in
the non-prot sector may lead to the crowding out of pro-socially motivated non-prot
managers who fear being (incorrectly) perceived as monetarily driven.
5. Case Studies
In this section, we present two groups of case studies that illustrate the applications
of our model to large-scale recent real-life phenomena in international development
efforts. The rst group presents the analysis of the NGO sector in developing countries
25. Another form of signalling is possible if conditionally warm-glow donors differ in size, and large
donors can obtain information (even if noisy) about the non-prot managers’ types at some cost. The
models by Vesterlund (2003) and Andreoni (2006), where obtaining a large leadership donation serves as
a credible signal of quality, can serve as a microfoundation for this type of analysis.
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(Uganda and Pakistan) and its governance problems, in particular related to the inows
of foreign aid. The second focuses on the international NGO humanitarian efforts
and the dynamics of post-reconstruction by international NGOs, following the natural
disasters (specically, the December 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean and the January
2009 earthquake in Haiti).
5.1. The NGO Sector in Developing Countries
5.1.1. Uganda. Substantial narrative evidence for several developing countries
indicates that generous nancing by foreign aid can lead to perverse effects by
triggering opportunistic behavior and elite capture in these local NGO projects (see,
e.g., Platteau and Gaspart, 2003; Platteau, 2004; the contributions in Bierschenk et
al., 2000; Gueneau and Leconte, 1998). Here, we discuss one of the best-documented
analyses, that of the NGO sector in Uganda. This analysis was conducted by a
team of development economists at Oxford University’s Center for Study of African
Economies (see Barr et al. 2003, 2005; Fafchamps and Owens 2009; Burger and Owens
2010, 2013).
The analysis is based on a unique representative national survey of NGOs, collected
by Abigail Barr, Marcel Fafchamps, and Trudy Owens in 2002, and nanced by
the World Bank and the Japanese government. The aim of the study was to collect
information about Ugandan NGOs’ activities, their sources of funding, and their
personnel. The surveys were conducted with about 300 NGOs (out of about 3500
registered ones), and the main descriptive ndings were published as a CSAE report
to the Government of Uganda in December 2003 (Barr et al. 2003).
Several interesting facts emerge from this study. The bulk of funding of Ugandan
NGOs comes from international NGOs. These latter often conduct their own
monitoring, but despite this, the authors argue that it is difcult to exclude that there
are "crooks" in the sector. The authors note:
"It is possible that the uidity of the NGO sector and the focus on non-material services
(e.g., ‘talk’ and ‘advocacy’) enable unscrupulous individuals to take advantage of the
system... There is indeed a suspicion among policy circles that not all Ugandan NGOs
genuinely take public interest to heart. [Some] accounts speak of crooks and swindlers
attracted to the sector by the prospect of securing grant money... In a context where most
charity funding comes from international benefactors, new incentive problems emerge.
One is that of opportunistic NGOs whereby talented Ugandans initiate a local NGO not so
much because they care about public good but because they hope to attract external funding
to pay themselves a wage" (Barr et al. 2003: 4-7).
In a companion paper, Barr et al. (2005) write:
"According to respondents, per diems to staff and beneciaries account for less than
2% of the total expenditures for the sample as a whole (slightly more for small NGOs).
However, we suspect these data are not fully accurate and that there may be additional per
diems included in program and miscellaneous costs. Ugandan NGOs are well aware that
they are scrutinized by members and donors for excessive salary and per diem payments.
They may therefore be tempted to hide these payments in other costs, or to simply misreport
them. Given the poor quality of nancial accounts provided by surveyed NGOs, it is
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difcult to determine the extent to which NGO prots are redistributed to staff via the
payment of per diems. What is clear, however, is that most surveyed NGOs do not have
transparent accounts" (Barr et al. 2005: 667)
If the Ugandan NGO sector is facing a serious problem of fraud, why is it unable to
create institutions that screen or limit such behavior? The report provides some answers
to this:
"Developed countries all have instituted sophisticated legislation regulating charities.
This is because unscrupulous individuals may solicit funds from the public without actually
serving the public good they are supposed to serve. Hit-and-run crooks may take the money
and disappear. More sophisticated crooks may set up an organization that partly serves its
stated objective, but at the same time either divert funds directly to their pocket or spend
part of the money on perks, allowances, and excess salaries. This kind of behaviour is
damaging to charitable organizations at large because it undermines the public’s trust in
them and reduces funding. It is therefore in the interest of bona de charities to regulate the
industry so as to weed out crooks... Reporting requirements, however, impose an additional
burden of work in charities. Moreover, they are useless unless they are combined with the
Charities Commission’s capacity to investigate the veracity of the reports provided. Crooks
smart enough to defraud granting agencies are also smart enough to produce a fake report
for the Charities Commission" (Barr et al. 2003: 7)
Would peer monitoring be a solution to this problem? The report indicates that
certain Ugandan NGOs tried to create such institutions, but they do not seem to
function:
"While some NGO networks have actively sought to promote good governance among
their member organizations, to our knowledge, none has sought to set up a formal
certication system. Instead, networks and umbrella organizations have sought to be
inclusive and have welcomed new members with little or no attempt at quality control"
(Barr et al. 2005: 675).
The only mechanism that limits the misbehavior of NGOs seems to be donors’
(imperfect) control. In fact, the international NGOs seem to concentrate most of their
nancing in a few Ugandan NGOs. The authors argue that "one possible explanation
is that foreign donors cannot identify the most promising NGOs and therefore
concentrate their activities on a small number of trusted NGOs. Another possibility
is that many sampled NGOs are engaged in a ‘rent seeking’ process by which they
seek self-employment by attracting grants. Donors may have correctly identied them
as undeserving and denied them funding" (Barr et al. 2003: 27).
5.1.2. Pakistan. Another interesting case study comes from Pakistan and is based on
the analysis by Bano (2008). Motivated by the recent trend of aid policies aiming at
strengthening the local civil society, this study focused on the effects of channeling
development aid through local NGOs. The author conducted a comparative in-depth
survey of 40 local Pakistani NGOs: 20 NGOs that rely on foreign aid for their nancing
and 20 that rely only on domestic nancing. Although the sample is relatively small,
the author tried to maximize the national coverage in selecting the organizations
across all the regions of Pakistan and focusing strictly on the organizations providing
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public goods (i.e., excluding the organizations aimed at providing benets only to their
members).
The main ndings of the study are three. First, the NGOs that relied on foreign
aid were much more likely to have no members. Interestingly, several authors
(Henderson, 2002; Tvedt, 1998) previously had documented that the absence of
members usually implies high salary of the NGO leader and poor overall performance
of the organization. Thus, it is likely that these NGOs relying on foreign aid in many
cases were just "empty shells".
Secondly, there were large motivational differnces between the NGOs relying on
foreign aid and those relying on domestic nancing (see Table 4 in Bano, 2008).
For instance, nearly all the aid-nanced NGOs, the leader drew a salary above the
governmental scale (while this happened in none of the domestic-nanced ones). The
ofces of all the aid-nanced NGOs located in luxury areas of the cities (none for
domestic-nanced ones), the majority of aid-nanced NGOs had four-wheel drive
cars (none for domestic-nanced ones), and in all of aid-nanced NGOs the project
was designed rst and beneciaries chosen after (while the opposite was true for the
domestic-nanced NGOs.
Finally, NGOs relying on foreign aid exhibited lower organizational performance,
as measured by uctuation in annuals budgets and the stability of the type of activities.
The aid-nanced NGOs showed dramatic uctuations in their annual budgets, in
response to aid ows, whereas the budgets of domestic-nanced NGOs were quite
stable. The activities of aid-nanced NGOs kept changing in response to aid ows,
while the focus of the domestic-nanced organizations’ activities remained stable.
Although the study relied on interviews and the causal identication of aid
nancing was not feasible quantitatively, on the basis of additional qualitative evidence
Bano (2008) argues foreign aid led to a modication of material aspirations among
leaders of NGOs, which in turn resulted in lower performance. For instance, one of
the interviewed NGO leaders noted that, as an organization starts to rely on foreign
aid, "the people who are more interested in personal gains start getting attracted to the
organization" (Bano, 2008: 2303).
Although our model assumes that the inow of foreign aid is distributed equally
among NGOs, the above ndings can still be explained in the light of our model’s
main mechanism, and can be interpreted as a transition stage when moving from
the equilibrium without foreign aid to the one with foreign aid. Our model predicts
that, starting with an honest equilibrium without foreign nancing, an aid inow
would trigger entry into the NGO sector by selsh agents seeking rents. The 20
organizations in the study that rely on foreign aid can be thought of as such entrants. In
the meanwhile, the NGOs without foreign aid nancing still operate as under the "no
foreign aid" regime. Over time, as selsh agents enter the NGO sector in even higher
numbers, the motivated agents start to quit the sector. If our model is valid, we should
observe over time that the number (and the share) of NGOs in Pakistan that do not rely
on foreign aid nancing with their leaders showing relatively low material aspirations
should decrease. This is an interesting prediction that hopefully can be tested in the
future work.
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5.2. Humanitarian Emergencies and International NGOs
5.2.1. The 2004 Tsunami. On December 26, 2004, a tsunami of unprecedented
power, triggered by the Sumatra-Andaman undersea earthquake, hit the coastal areas of
14 countries in Asia and Africa (with Indonesia and Sri Lanka receiving the strongest
impact). It was one of the deadliest natural disasters in recent history, killing close
to 230 000 people and displacing over 1.75 million people. The scale of the disaster,
coinciding with it happening right after Christmas and fed by a large-scale international
media coverage, led to a massive humanitarian response, both through public and
private channels. The amount of private donations to international NGOs was huge:
for example, Save the Children USA received over 6 million USD in just four days,
whereas Catholic Relief Services collected over 1 million USD in three days. In
total, U.S.-based charities raised about 1.6 billion USD for tsunami relief (Wallace
and Wilhelm 2005), whereas total international response (both public and private)
amounted to 17 billion USD (Jayasuriya and McCawley 2010).
The evolution of the resulting humanitarian relief activity presents an interesting
story. It started off with early successes: for instance, Inderfurth et al. (2005) write:
"The tsunami will be remembered as a model for effective global disaster response...
Because of the speed and generosity of the response, its effectiveness compared to previous
(and even subsequent) disasters, and its sustained focus on reconstruction and prevention,
we give the overall aid effort a grade of ’A’... ".
However, quite soon, numerous problems in relief activities started to emerge.
These included inefciencies in the distribution of funds, unsatisfactory plans for
the rebuilding of houses, cost escalations, and coordination failures (Jayasuriya and
McCawley 2010: 4). This is summarized by the Joint Evaluation Report of the Tsunami
Evaluation Coalition:
" Exceptional international funding provided the opportunity for an exceptional
international response. However, the pressure to spend money quickly and visibly worked
against making the best use of local and national capacities... Many efforts and capacities
of locals and nationals were marginalized by an overwhelming flood of well-funded
international agencies (as well as hundreds of private individuals and organisations), which
controlled immense resources" (Telford et al. 2006: 18-19).
The observers underline several mechanisms behind this failure. One of them was
the pressure to rapidly disburse huge amount of donations, which weakened the control
mechanisms on how the money was spent. Maxwell et al. (2012) note that:
"During the response to the 2004 tsunami, many agencies reported intense pressure to
speed up the rate at which donations were being expended, in part to ensure an ongoing
ow of funds. Sometimes, however, the need to act swiftly may result from the situation on
the ground, not just from donor or media pressure. While pressure to spend speedily does
not, in itself, cause corruption, it may mean that standard checks and systems intended to
prevent corruption are overridden or ignored" (Maxwell et al. 2012: 143).
A related mechanism is the rush of too many NGOs to carry out highly visible
activities in disaster-prone areas:
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"One of the striking features of the relief effort was the presence of a horde of small,
often newly formed, foreign organizations with little if any experience in disaster relief but
motivated by a strong humanitarian impulse that ‘something had to be done’. Throughout
the tsunami affected areas small groups and individuals from a wide range of countries
were active in all sorts of activities. For instance, a Slovakian organization was engaged
in boatbuilding, while an Austrian NGO assisted in constructing houses. Neither had any
previous experience of South Asia or disaster relief. Similarly individuals from Europe,
North America and Asia whose only prior knowledge of Sri Lanka came from news
bulletins arrived in the country and proceeded to do whatever they thought useful" (Stirrat
2006: 14)
This dynamics ts well the main predictions of our model. A sudden natural
disaster creates a sharp increase in the willingness to give of individual donors (an
increase in ı) and/or a large increase in foreign aid (a big increase in ). This attracts
a mass of agents to enter the non-prot sector (here, founding new NGOs). However,
given that many of these agents were mostly driven by ego-utility obtained from high
visibility, our model would predict that a large fraction of the donations will end up
being spent in projects that do not necessarily help the beneciaries (or possibly help
them only in the short run, but prove to be useless in the medium run).
An alternative explanation to the above patterns is the lack of experience and
knowledge of certain NGOs that entered the donation market during natural disasters.
As Willitts-King and Harvey (2005, Section 2.4) note, administrative inefciency
in humanitarian relief is different from corruption, although both are harmful for
the performance of the humanitarian aid system. However, on the basis of an in-
depth study and interviews with humanitarian relief professionals, conducted shortly
after the massive inow of humanitarian relief organizations into the tsunai-hit areas,
they also provide a detailed list of major corruption risks at various levels of the
humanitarian relief chain, including inating overheads, setting up bogus NGOs,
kickbacks from procurement, eld staff collusion with diversion, listing phantom staff,
etc. For instance, they write:
"Once funds have been passed to an agency [NGO], there are many opportunities
for individuals to make personal gain. This normally entails some collusion between
agency staff internally, or between staff and outside suppliers or authorities. At eld level,
staff might be ‘paid off’ for turning a blind eye to the false registration of relatives on
a distribution list, or theft from a warehouse. Staff might themselves extract payments
directly to include people on beneciary lists who do not t vulnerability criteria.
Procurement, storage and transport offer widespread opportunities for corruption. Staff
might accept kickbacks or bribes to favour a particular supplier or agree an inated quote,
or relatives might be preferred even though the quality or price is uncompetitive... Other
experiences included the use of agency vehicles to provide paid rides, taxi services, or in
some cases public bus services" (Willitts-King and Harvey, 2005: 21-22)
Given this analysis, it is difcult to imagine that the main source of failure of
the humanitarian aid system after the tsunami is driven only by the administrative
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inefciency. More likely, it is the combination of entry of unscrupulous or visibility-
seeking actors at various layers of the aid chain with administrative inefciency and
lack of coordination that generated the poor outcomes of the overall system26.
5.2.2. The 2010 Haiti Earthquake. On January 12, 2010, a 7.0-magnitude earthquake
hit Haiti, the poorest country of the Western hemisphere. This also was an extremely
violent natural disaster, killing more than 200 000 people in a very short period of time,
and destroying most of the administrative capacity of the state. Similarly to the case
of 2004 tsunami, the international humanitarian response to this disaster was massive.
Between 2010 and 2012, the total amount over 8 billion USD (of which 3 billion came
through international NGOs) was given by the international community for the post-
earthquake reconstruction activities. One of the largest French NGOs, Medecins Sans
Frontieres (MSF), noted that its Haiti intervention was the largest in the long history
of this organization (Biquet 2013: 130).
This rush in international humanitarian efforts fuelled by generous donations,
made NGOs key players in the reconstruction efforts. The presence of NGOs,
already considerable before the earthquake, became so massive as for Haiti being
dubbed in international circles as "the Republic of NGOs" (Klarreich and Polman
2012). Similar to the post-tsunami reconstruction, early successes were followed by
disappointing outcomes later on: the lack of coordination between NGOs and the
complex overlapping system of aid actors that emerged became a problem rather than
a solution. This was made most apparent during the cholera epidemics that hit Haiti
in October 2010. Biquet (2013) reports that more than 80% of patients in the three
months following the outbreak of the epidemics were taken care of by two actors
(Cuban medical brigades and the MSF) acting outside the ’Health Cluster’ which
concentrated all the other NGOs with health-related activities (there were more than
600 international organizations in this cluster).
One key explanation proposed for the failure of international humanitarian
assistance in Haiti is the lack of accountability of organizations carrying out
interventions, coupled with massive budgets. Klarreich and Polman (2012) argue that
this resulted in a complete disconnection from the needs of the local population and
exclusion of local civil society, more knowledgeable about the local conditions and
needs, from the reconstruction effort:
"From the very beginning, NGOs followed their own agendas and set their own
priorities, largely excluding the Haitian government and civil society... The money that
did reach Haiti has often failed to seed projects that truly respond to Haitians’ needs. The
problem is not exactly that funds were wasted or even stolen , though that has sometimes
been the case. Rather, much of the relief wasn’t spent on what was most needed... [As a
26. Most of the existing discussions of the performance of humanitarian aid to the 2004 tsunami concern
international or Northen NGOs. In the context of our model, given that these NGOs were founded in
different countries, they could be facing different types of occupational equilibria. However, Willitts-
King and Harvey (2005) show that the diversion of funds during humanitarian relief can occur both at
the international organizations’ level and at the local level (and probably, both levels were subject to this
problem). Therefore, our analytical framework still applies to this context.
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result] the recovery effort has been so poorly managed as to leave the country even weaker
than before." (Klarreich and Polman 2012)
As in the case of 2004 tsunami, the massive increase in the number of NGOs
carrying out activities was driven by donors’ willingness to give, in the absence of any
- even minimal - certication of NGOs. Haver and Foley (2011) state that "the response
to the Haiti earthquake of 2010 [was one] in which thousands of NGOs, many of them
unqualied ‘cowboy NGOs’, rushed in to help". The authors argue that instituting
a certication scheme would have curbed (at least in part) this drive; however, they
also acknowledge that such a scheme would have been quite difcult to implement
(for instance, it would have turned away many local or regional NGOs for whom the
paperwork related to such certication would have been prohibitively complicated or
costly).
6. Conclusion
We built a tractable general equilibrium model of private provision of public goods
via endogenous voluntary contributions to the non-prot sector. Our model shows that
rent-seeking or ego-utility seeking motives may attract selsh individuals to the non-
prot sector, which in turn may end up crowding out intrinsically motivated agents
from this sector. Selsh motives and the possibility of motivational crowding out
become increasingly severe as economies get richer and give more generously to the
non-prot sector. The main applications of our theory belong to two domains.
The rst is foreign aid intermediation by NGOs. Aid is being increasingly
channelled via NGOs. This is to a large extent the result of the growing disillusionment
in government-to-government project aid, often considered to be politicized and easily
corruptible (see, for instance, Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Kuziemko and Werker
(2006)). The rise of NGO intermediation has meant an increasing emphasis of project
ownership, decentralization, and participatory development. However, no theoretical
analysis has been conducted so far concerning the general-equilibrium implications of
such massive channelling of aid via NGOs.27 The application of our theory to foreign
aid sheds light on these issues. In particular, a key implication of our results is that, as
the NGO channel of aid expands, the investment into better accountability in the NGO
sector becomes increasingly important, so as to curb self-interested motives. In other
words, optimal aid delivery through NGOs requires harder controls accompanying the
scaling-up of aid efforts.
The second application pertains to the recent debates on the accountability and
performance-based pay in the non-prot sector in developed countries. The existing
literature recognizes that rms in the non-prot sector are often prone to agency
problems, due to the inherent difculty of measuring their performance. Understanding
27. In a partial-equilibrium framework, this issue has been studied in the contributions mentioned in the
introduction and in a recent review by Mansuri and Rao (2013).
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the conditions under which these problems are most salient is an open issue in the
public economics literature. Our analysis contributes to this debate by indicating
that the role of (endogenously determined) outside options of selsh and motivated
individuals inside the non-prot sector is crucial. In particular, what matters is whether
it is motivated or selsh agents that exit more intensively the non-prot sector when
donations from the private sector decrease. If selsh agents exit more intensively, then
recessions can have a cleansing effect regarding the motivational composition of the
non-prot sector. This is, in our view, an interesting hypothesis that could be tested
empirically in future work.
Two further promising avenues for future research are worth mentioning. The
rst is the role of specic public policy instruments towards the non-prot sector.
Several recent studies on the economic of charities and non-prots have explored the
effectiveness of direct versus matching grants (Andreoni and Payne (2003, 2011);
Karlan et al. (2011)). Our analysis indicates that matching grants might have an
additional effect that operates through the motivational composition of the non-prot
sector: such nancing induces non-prots to engage more actively in fundraising (and
thus to reduce their internal resources devoted to working on their projects), and this
might induce the motivated individuals to quit the non-prot sector. A more complete
analysis of the effectiveness of matching grants as compared to direct ones, that takes
into account these various effects, looks very promising.
The second relates to the disconnection between who nances and who benets
from the activity of the non-prot sector. The resulting monitoring problems create
the need to coordinate the scaling up of nancing with investment into improved
monitoring. As suggested by Ruben (2012), evaluation of aid effectiveness may
generate social benets even when one can learn relatively little from the evaluation
exercise. This is because the very fact of being evaluated makes the misallocation of
aid resources more difcult and thus help improve the motivational composition in the
non-prot sector. Our framework may allow to study these indirect effects of evaluation
of development projects.
Appendix A: Endogenous Fundraising Effort
Our benchmark model assumed that total donations are equally split (quite
mechanically) between all non-prot rms. It is well known, however, that non-prots
actively compete quite intensely for donations via fundraising activities.28 Here we
relax the assumption of xed division of donations by incorporating the endogenous
fundraising choice by non-prots. In terms of the private sector, we keep the same
structure described in Section 2.1. The main difference is that now non-prot managers
28. See, for example, De Waal (1997) and Hancock (1989) for some poignant recounts of the fundraising
effort spent by non-prot organizations by using the social media both in the developed and developing
world.
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can inuence the share of funds they obtain from the pool of total donations by exerting
fundraising effort.
We assume that each non-prot manager i is endowed with one unit of time,
which she may split between fundraising and working towards the mission of her non-
prot organization (project implementation). Fundraising effort allows the non-prot
manager to attract a larger share of donations (from the pool of aggregate donations) to
her own non-prot. Implementation effort is required in order to make those donations
effective in addressing the non-prot’s mission. We denote henceforth by ei  0
the effort exerted in fundraising and by &i  0 the implementation effort. The time
constraint means that ei C &i D 1.
As before, the non-prot manager collects an amount of donations i from the
aggregate pool of donations D. One part of i , equal to wi , is allocated for the perks,
while i   wi is used as input for the non-prot’s production. In this section, in the
sake of algebraic simplicity, we assume that the output of a non-prot rm is linear in
undistributed donations, namely:
gi D 2.i  wi /&i : (A.1)
An important feature of gi in (A.1) is the fact that undistributed donations .i   wi /
and implementation effort (&i ) are complements in the production function of the non-
prot.
We assume that aggregate fundraising effort does not alter the total pool of
donations channeled to the non-prot sector, D. However, the fundraising effort
exerted by each specic non-prot manager affects the division of D among the mass
of non-prot rms N . In other words, we model fundraising as a zero-sum game over
the division of a given D. Formally, we assume that
i D D
N
 eiNe D
ıA .1 N/˛
N
 eiNe ; (A.2)
where Ne denotes the average fundraising effort in the non-prot sector as a whole.
Again, non-prot managers derive utility from the two dimensions, with weights on
each of two sources of utility determined by the agent’s level of pro-social motivation,
mi . In addition, we assume the total effort exerted by non-prot managers entails a
level of disutility which depends on the agent’s intrinsic pro-social motivation:
Ui .wi ; gi / D w
1 mi
i g
mi
i
m
mi
i .1 mi /1 mi
  .1 mi / .ei C &i / , where mi 2 ¹mH ;mLº:
Since mH D 1, in the optimum, motivated non-prot managers will always set
wH D 0 and eH C &H D 1. The exact values of eH and &H are determined by the
following optimization problem
eH  arg max
ei2Œ0;1
W gi D 2D
N
ei
Ne .1  ei / ;
with &H D 1  eH . The above problem yields,
eH D &H D
1
2
; (A.3)
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which in turn implies that an mH -type non-prot manager obtains a level of utility
given by
U H D
1
2 Ne
D
N
D 1
2 Ne
ıA .1 N/˛
N
: (A.4)
With regards to selsh non-prot managers, again, they will always set wL D i .
In addition, since selsh agents care only about their private consumption and &i is
only instrumental to producing non-prot output, in the optimum, they will always set
&i D 0. As a consequence, the level of eL will be determined by the solution of the
following maximization problem
eL  arg max
ei2Œ0;1
W wi D D
N
ei
Ne   ei ;
which, given the linearity of both the benet and the cost of effort, trivially yields
eL D
²
0, if Ne 1D=N < 1;
1, if Ne 1D=N  1: (A.5)
The utility that a selsh agent obtains from becoming a non-prot manager is thus:
U L D max
²
D
N
1
Ne   1; 0
³
: (A.6)
Note that the indirect utility of the selsh agent decreases, as before, with the size of
the non-prot sector. However, it now reaches zero at an interior value, whereas in the
basic model that occurred only whenN D 1. The reason for this is that donations must
now be obtained through exerting effort, which is costly tomH -types. For a sufciently
large size of the non-prot sector, the level donations per non-prot rm that can be
obtained through fundraising effort is just too small to justify their effort cost. This
means that a selsh agent will choose to stop competing for donations if the number
of non-prots rms N reaches a certain critical level (beyond such critical level of N
selsh managers would optimally choose to exert no effort and collect zero donations,
which accordingly yields U L D 0).
H-equilibrium. In an H-equilibrium all non-prot managers are of mH -type and set
eH D 0:5. This implies that each non-prot manager ends up raising
H D
ıA
 
1 N H
˛
N H
: (A.7)
Recalling (4), (A.4) and (A.6), we can observe that an H-equilibrium exists if and only
if H  1.
L-equilibrium. In an L-equilibrium all non-prot managers are of mL-type and set
eL D 1. In this case, each non-prot manager raises
L D
ıA
 
1 N L
˛
N L
: (A.8)
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Using again (4), (A.4) and (A.6), it follows that an L-equilibrium exists if and only if
L > 2.
Mixed-type Equilibrium. In a mixed-type equilibrium all agents are indifferent across
occupations and the non-prot sector is managed by a mix of mH  and mL types.
That is, a mixed-type equilibrium is characterized byU H .N /D U L .N /D V P .N /,
where N  D N L C N H and 0 < N L ;N H  1=2. Equality among (A.4) and (A.6)
requires that average fundraising effort satises Nemixed D 0:5  .D=N/, which in turn
means that U H .N / D U L .N / D 1. The returns in the private sector must then
also equal to one, which, using (4), implies that N  D 1 A1=1 ˛ . In addition, since
eH D 0:5 and eL D 1, then Nemixed D 0:5  .D=N/, together with N  D 1 A1=1 ˛ ,
pin down the exact values of N L and N H .
Equilibrium Characterization eith Fundraising Effort. We now fully characterize the
type of equilibrium that arises in the model with fundraising effort.
Proposition A.1. The equilibrium allocation that arises is always unique and
depends on the specific parametric configuration of the model.
1. IfA  1= .1C ı/1 ˛ , the economy exhibits an ‘H-equilibrium’ withN  D N H D
ı=.1C ı/. All non-profit managers exert the same level of fundraising and project
implementation effort: eH D &H D 0:5.
2. If A  Œ2= .2C ı/1 ˛ , the economy exhibits an ‘L-equilibrium’ with N  D N L ,
where ı=.2C ı/ < N L < ı=.1C ı/. All non-profit managers exert the same level
of fundraising and project implementation effort: eL D 1 and &L D 0.
3. If 1= .1C ı/1 ˛ < A < Œ2= .2C ı/1 ˛ , the economy exhibits a mixed-type
equilibrium with a mass of non-profit firms equal to N mixed D 1 A1=1 ˛ , where
N H D 2
h
1 A 11 ˛ .1C ı=2/
i
; and N L D A
1
1 ˛ .1C ı/  1: (A.9)
Motivated non-profit managers set eH D &H D 0:5, while mL-types set eL D 1
and &L D 0.
The result of an ‘H-equilibrium’ when A  1= .1C ı/1 ˛ is the analogous to that
one previously obtained in the basic model. Similarly, when A  Œ2= .2C ı/1 ˛ the
model features a pure ‘L-equilibrium’. One novelty of this alternative setup is that for
the intermediate range of A there exists a "mixed-type" equilibrium. Intuitively, the
necessity of competition for donations reduces the utility of the unmotivated agents.
As a consequence, this creates parameter congurations under which, in the absence
of fundraising competition the non-prot sector would be populated only by selsh
agents, whereas in the presence of competition a fraction of them moves into the private
sector (and are in turn replaced by a fraction of motivated agents).29
29. It is interesting to compare these ndings to those of Aldashev and Verdier (2010), where more
intense competition for funds actually leads to higher diversion of donations by non-prot managers. This
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Appendix B: Altruism-dependent Private Donations
The model presented in Section 2 assumes that all private entrepreneurs (regardless of
their pro-social motivation) donate an identical fraction of their income to the non-
prot sector. However, if warm-glow giving is a driven by (impure) altruism, it is
reasonable to expect the propensity to donate to be increasing in the degree of pro-
social motivation of an individual. Here, we modify the utility function in (3) by letting
the propensity to donate be type-specic (ıi ) and increasing in mi . In particular, we
now assume that ıi D ıH 2 .0; 1 when mi D mH , whereas ıi D ıL D 0 when
mi D mL.30
The key difference that arises when ıi is an increasing function of mi is that, for
a given value of 1 N , the total level of donations will depend positively on the ratio
.1  NH /=.1  N/. Intuitively, the fraction of entrepreneurial income donated to the
non-prot sector will rise with the (average) level of warm-glow motivation displayed
by the pool of private entrepreneurs.
To keep the analysis simple, we abstract from fundraising effort, and assume that
the mass of total donations is equally split between the mass of non-prots. In addition,
we let the payoff functions by motivated and selsh non-prot entrepreneurs be given
again by (8) and (9), respectively. Donations collected by a non-prot are now given
by:
D
N
D ıH A
 
1
2
 NH

.1 NH  NL/1 ˛ .NH CNL/
: (B.1)
When the total amount of donations to the non-prot sector depends positively on
the fraction of pro-socially motivated private entrepreneurs, the model gives room to
multiple equilibria. The main reason for equilibrium multiplicity is that, when ıi is
increasing in mi , the ratio between U H and U L does not depend only on the level of
N , as it was the case with (8) and (9) in Section 2. Instead, observing (B.1), one sees
that it also depends on how N breaks down between NH and NL. Such dependence
on the ratio NH=NL generates a positive interaction between the incentives by mL-
types to self-select into the non-prot sector and the self-selection of mH -types into
the private sector. The next proposition deals with this issue in further detail.
Proposition B.1. Let ıi D ıH 2 .0; 1 formi DmH and ıi D ıL D 0 formi DmL.
Then,
occurs because when agents have to spend more time raising funds, then less time is left for working
towards the non-prot mission, and thus the opportunity cost of diverting money for private consumption
falls. In that model, all agents are intrinsically identical, and thus the issue of more intense competition
lies in aggravating a moral hazard problem. Here, instead, the existence of motivationally heterogeneous
types implies that the main problem is one of adverse selection, and a more intense competition for funds
mitigates the severity of this adverse selection problem.
30. Notice that, in the specic case in which ıH D 1, the utility functions in the private sector and the
non-prot sector would display the same structure for both mH - and mL-types: for the former, all the
utility weight is being placed on pro-social actions (either warm-glow giving or producing gi ); for the
latter, all the utility weight is being placed on private consumption.
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1. Unique ‘H-equilibrium’: If A < .1  ıH=2/1 ˛ , the equilibrium in the economy
is unique, and characterized by ıH= .2C 2ıH / < N H < 12 and N L D 0.
2. Unique ‘L-equilibrium’: IfA > Œ.2C ıH / = .2C 2ıH /1 ˛ , the equilibrium in the
economy is unique, and characterized by N L D ıH=2 and N H D 0.
3. Multiple equilibria: If .1  ıH=2/1 ˛ < A < Œ.2C ıH / = .2C 2ıH /1 ˛ , there
exist three equilibria in the economy,31
(a) an ‘H-equilibrium’ where ıH= .2C 2ıH / < N H < 12 and N L D 0;
(b) an ‘L-equilibrium’ where N L D ıH=2 and N H D 0I
(c) a ‘mixed-type equilibrium’ where
N H D 1=2 
1 A1=.1 ˛/
ıH
and N L D

1 A1=.1 ˛/ .1C ıH /
ıH
  1=2:
Proposition B.1 shows that forA sufciently small the economy will exhibit a high-
effectiveness equilibrium, whereas when A is sufciently large the economy will fall
into a low-effectiveness equilibrium. These two results are in line with those previously
shown in Proposition 1.
However, Proposition B.1 also shows that there exists an intermediate range,
.1  ıH=2/1 ˛ < A < Œ1  ıH= .2C 2ıH /1 ˛ , in which the economy displays
multiple equilibria. For those intermediate values of A, the exact type of equilibrium
that takes place will depend on the coordination of agents’ expectations. If agents
expect a large mass ofmH -types to choose the non-prot sector (case a), then the total
mass of private donations (for a givenN ) will be relatively small, stiing the incentives
of mL-types to become non-prot managers. Conversely, if individuals expect a large
mass of mH -types to become private entrepreneurs (case b), the value of D (for a
given N ) will turn out to be large, which will enhance the incentives of mL-types
to enter into the non-prot sector more than it does so for mH -types. Notice that the
range of productivityA for which multiple equilibria occur increases with the (relative)
generosity of the motivated individuals, ıH .32
Finally, Proposition B.1 also shows that, within the range of multiple equilibria,
there is also the possibility of intermediate consistent expectations (case c). When this
happens, both motivated and selsh agents are indifferent across occupations, and a
mix of mL- and mH -types will end up populating the non-prot sector.
31. In the specic cases whereAD .1  ıH =2/1 ˛ orAD Œ1  ıH = .2C 2ıH /1 ˛ , the ‘mixed-
type equilibrium’ described below disappears, while the other two equilibria remain.
32. The range of values of A subject to multiple equilibria vanishes as ıH approaches zero.
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Appendix C: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Part (i). First of all, notice that by replacing N D N0 into (9), it follows that
A.1C ı/1 ˛ > 1 implies U L .N0/ > 1. Hence, since U L .bN/D 1, it must necessarily
be the case that N0 < yN . Because of Lemma 1, this also means that U L .N0/ >
U H .N0/. Now, since U L .N0/ D y.N0/, then y.N / < U L .N0/ for any N < N0,
meaning that wheneverN <N0 the mass of non-prot managers must at least be equal
to 0:5 (the total mass ofmL-types). But this contradicts the fact thatN0 < 0:5; hence an
equilibrium withN < N0 cannot exist. Moreover, an equilibrium withN > N0 cannot
exist either, because whenever N > N0 holds, y.N / > U H .N / and y.N / > U L .N /,
contradicting the fact that there is a mass of individuals equal to N > 0 choosing to
become non-prot managers. As a result, when A.1C ı/1 ˛ > 1, an allocation with
N  D N L D N0 represents the unique equilibrium. Since U H .N0/ < U L .N0/ D
y.N0/, in the equilibrium, all mH -type become private entrepreneurs, and a mass
0:5   N0 of mL-type agents (who are indifferent between the two occupations) also
become private entrepreneurs.
Part (ii). Since A.1C ı/1 ˛ < 1 implies U L .N0/ < 1, when the former inequality
holds, N0 > yN . Moreover, notice that an equilibrium with N  N0 cannot be exist,
as it would contradict the fact that N0 < 0:5. In turn, because the equilibrium must
necessarily verify N > N0 > yN , only motivated agents will become non-prot
managers, while all selsh agents will self-select into the for-prot sector. Now, by the
denition ofN1 in (11), it follows that ifN1  0:5, thenN  DN H DN1 represents the
unique equilibrium allocation (notice thatA.1C ı/1 ˛ < 1 ensuresN1 > N0). In this
situation, themH -types are indifferent across occupations (and there is a mass 0:5 N1
of them in the private sector), while whenN <N1 all motivated agents wish to become
non-prot managers contradictingN < 0:5, and whenN >N1 nobody would actually
choose the non-prot sector, contradicting N > 0. With a similar reasoning, it is
straightforward to prove that whenN1 > 0:5, the unique equilibrium allocation is given
by N  D N H D 0:5, as in that case the condition U L .1=2/ < y .1=2/ < U H .1=2/
holds, whereas for N < 0:5 all mH -types intend to become non-prot managers, and
when N > 0:5 there is either nobody or only a mass one-half of agents who wish to
go the non-prot sector.
Proof of Proposition 2
Part (i). First of all, recalling (13), notice 21 ˛A > 1 implies N < 1=2. Using the
results in Proposition 1, it then follows that when A.1C ı/1 ˛ < 1 < 21 ˛A and
 D 0, in equilibrium, N  D N H D N1, where recall that N1 is implicitly dened by
(11). Let nowNH be implicitly dened by the following condition:
N H

ıA .1 NH /˛ C

.1 NH /1 ˛  AI (C.1)
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in raw words,NH denotes the level of N that equalizes (2) and the utility obtained by
a motivated non-prot manager when D=N is given by (12). From (C.1), it is easy to
observe that whenD 0,NH D N1. In addition, differentiating (C.1) with respect to
NH and , we obtain that @NH=@ > 0. Let now
0  1 A 11 ˛ .1C ı/; (C.2)
and, using (13), notice that

ıA .1 N/˛ C0

=N D 1; hence NH .0/ D N . As
a consequence of all this, when A.1C ı/1 ˛ < 1 < 21 ˛A, for all 0   < 0, in
equilibrium, N  D N H D NH ./, where @NH=@ > 0, and NH ./ W Œ0;0/ !
ŒN1;N /.
Part (ii). Using again the fact that ıA .1 N/˛ C0 =N D 1, from (12) it follows
that, for all  > 0, the utility achieved as non-prot managers by mL-types must be
strictly larger than that obtained by mH -types. Let now
A  2 ˛A
 
21 ˛A
 1 
   ı

: (C.3)
Using (2) and (12), notice that when N D 1=2 and  D A, the utility obtained
by motivated non-prot managers is equal to y .1=2/. All this implies that, when
A.1C ı/1 ˛ < 1 < 21 ˛A, for all 0   < A, in equilibrium, N  D N L DNL./  1=2, whereNL./ is non-decreasing in . In particular, for all 0   
2 ˛A.1  ı/ the functionNL./ is implicitly dened by
ıA .1 NL/˛ C
NL

.1 NL/1 ˛  A; (C.4)
while for all 2 ˛A.1  ı/ < <A,NL./D 1=2. Lastly, whenD 2 ˛A.1  ı/,
the expression in (C.4) impliesNL D 1=2, proving thatNL./ W .0;A! .N; 1=2
is continuous and weakly increasing.
Part (iii). First, note that when  > A, the expression in (C.1) delivers a value of
NH > 1=2. As a result, motivated agents must necessarily be indifferent in equilibrium
between the two occupations, since some of them must choose to actually work as
non-prot managers to allow NH > 1=2. In addition, since by denition of A in
(C.3), ıA

.1 N/˛ CA

=N > y.N/ when N D 1=2, all selsh agents must be
choosing the non-prot sector when  > A. Let thus NLH be implicitly dened by
the following condition:
N LH

ıA .1 NLH /˛ C

.1 NLH /1 ˛  A: (C.5)
Differentiating (C.5) with respect toNLH and, we can observe that @NLH=@ > 0.
From (C.5), we can also observe that lim!ANLH D 1=2 and lim!1NLH D 1.
As a result, we may write NLH ./ W .A;1/ !
 
1
2
; 1

, with @NLH=@ > 0.
Moreover, since N L D 1=2;8 > A, it must be the case that in equilibrium
N H D NLH ./  1=2.
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Proposition 2 (bis). If 21 ˛A < 1, there exists a threshold level B 2 .0;0/,
such that: (i) when 0    B , all non-profit firms are managed by mH -types; (ii)
when B <   0, non-profit firms are managed by a mix of types with mH -type
majority; (iii) when  > 0, non-profit firms are managed by a mix of types with
mL-type majority.
Proof. (i) Because of Proposition 1, when  D 0, in equilibrium, N H  1=2 and
N L D 0. Next, let B  2 ˛A.1  ı/, and note that,
2
h
ıA
 
1
2
˛ CBi D 21 ˛A; (C.6)
and note that the right-hand side of (C.6) equals y.1=2/, while its left-hand side equals
D=N when N D 1=2 and  D B . Furthermore, notice that 2ŒıA .1=2/˛ C  is
strictly increasing in . As a consequence, it follows that in equilibrium, N L D 0 for
any 0    B . In addition, denoting by NH ./ D min¹1=2; º, where  is the
solution of

ıA .1  /˛ C =D A=.1 /1 ˛ , the result,N H DNH ./ for any
0    B obtains.
(ii) This part of the proof follows from the denition of 0 in (C.2), together
with the fact that 2ŒıA .1=2/˛ C > 21 ˛A, for all  > B . As a result, we may
implicitly dene the function NHL./ by
ıA .1 NHL/˛ C
NHL

.1 NHL/1 ˛  A;
and observe that @NHL=@ > 0. Noting that, wheneverN DNHL./,mL-types are
indifferent across occupations completes the proof of this part.
(iii) This part of the proof follows again from the denition of 0 in (C.2), which
implies that for all > 0, the expression in (12) yieldsD=N > 1whenN D N . For
this reason, whenever>0, themH -types must be indifferent across occupations in
equilibrium, while all mL-types will strictly prefer the non-prot sector. We can then
implicitly dene the function NLH ./ by
N
 
LH

ıA .1 NLH /˛ C
 
.1 NLH /1 ˛  A;
and observe that @NLH=@ > 0 to complete the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3
First of all, from (15), it is straightforward to observe that neither NH D 0:5, nor
0 D NH < NL can possibly hold in equilibrium, as both situations would imply
D=N D 0, and no agent would thus choose the non-prot sector.
Second, set NL D 0 into (15), and take the limit of the resulting expression as NH
approaches zero, to obtain
lim
NH!0
D
N
ˇˇˇˇ
NLD0
D ıH A
2
NH
.NH /
2
D1:
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The above result in turn implies that 0D NH D NL cannot hold in equilibrium either,
as in that case the non-prot would become innitely appealing to mH -types.
Third, suppose 0 < NH < NL D 1=2. Using (2) and (15), for this to be an
equilibrium, it must necessarily be the case that
ıH A
 
1
2
 NH

NH 
1
2
 NH
1 ˛  1
2
CNH
2  A 1
2
 NH
1 ˛ : (C.7)
However, the condition (C.7) cannot possibly hold, since it would require
ıH .0:5 NH /NH  .0:5CNH /2, which can never be true.
Because of the previous three results, the only possible equilibrium combinations
are: (i) N L D 0 and 0 < N H < 0:5, (ii) 0  N L  0:5 and 0 < N H < 0:5, will all
types indifferent across occupations.
Case i. For this case to hold in equilibrium, condition (C.23) must be veried, which
following the same reasoning as before in the proof of Proposition B.1 leads to the
condition A < Œ.2C ıH / = .2C 2ıH /1 ˛ .
Case ii. For this case to hold in equilibrium, the following equalities must all
simultaneously hold
D
N
D ıH A
 
1
2
 NH

NH
.1 NH  NL/1 ˛ .NH CNL/2
D y.N / D A
.1 NH  NL/1 ˛
D 1:
(C.8)
Taking into account the denition of N in (13), it follows that y.N / D 1 requires
NH CNL D 1 A 11 ˛ . As a result, (C.8) boils down to the following condition:
ıH
 
1
2
 NH

NH  

1 A 11 ˛
2 D 0 (C.9)
The expression in (C.9) yields real-valued roots if and only if
A 

1 
p
ıH=4
1 ˛
: (C.10)
When (C.10) is satised, the solution of (C.9) is given by:
NH D
8ˆˆˆˆ
<ˆ
ˆˆˆ:
r0  1
4
 
s
1
16
 

1 A1=.1 ˛/2
ıH
;
r1  1
4
C
s
1
16
 

1 A1=.1 ˛/2
ıH
:
(C.11)
Note now that the roots r0 and r1 are not necessarily equilibrium solutions forNH .
More precisely, sinceNL D Œ1 A 11 ˛  NH , thenNL  0, NH  Œ1 A 11 ˛ . As
a consequence, for NH D r1 in (C.11) to actually be an equilibrium solution, it must
then be the case that r1  1 A 11 ˛ . But this inequality is true only in the specic case
Journal of the European Economic Association
Preprint prepared on 21 June 2017 using jeea.cls v1.0.
Aldashev, Jaimovich & Verdier Motivational Allocation and Non-Prot Sector 43
when A D  1 pıH=41 ˛ and pıH D 1, which in turn also implies that r1 D r0
in (C.11). Without any loss of generality, we may thus fully disregard r1, and check
under which conditions r0  1 A 11 ˛ .
Using (C.11), and letting x  1   A 11 ˛ , an equilibrium with NL  0 when
NH D r0 requires the following condition to hold:
‰.x/  1
4
 
s
1
16
  x
2
ıH
 x; (C.12)
Now, notice ‰.x/ D x when A D Œ.2C ıH / = .2C 2ıH /1 ˛ . In addition, noting
that ‰0.x/ > 0 and ‰00.x/ > 0, it then follows that: i) ‰.x/ < x, for all A >
Œ.2C ıH / = .2C 2ıH /1 ˛; while ‰.x/ > x, for all .1  
p
ıH=4/
1 ˛ < A <
Œ.2C ıH / = .2C 2ıH /1 ˛ . Consequently, when A  Œ.2C ıH / = .2C 2ıH /1 ˛ ,
there is an equilibrium with NH D r0 and NL D Œ1 A 11 ˛   r0.
Lastly, to prove that @f=@A < 0, note that f D ‰.x/=x, hence
@f
@A
D 1
4x2
@x
@A
  1
16x3

1
16
  x
2
ıH
  1
2 @x
@A
;
from where @f=@A < 0 stems from noting that @x=@A < 0 and that
1  1
4x

1
16
  x
2
ıH
  1
2
> 0;
because of (C.11).
Proof of Proposition 4
The conditions for an ‘L-equilibrium’, ‘H-equilibrium’ and a ‘mixed-type equilibrium’
are, respectively, as follows:
ıA
.1 NL/˛
NL

<
A
.1 NL/1 ˛
 ıA.1 NL/
˛
NL
; with NL  1=2: (C.13)
ıA
.1 NH /˛
NH
   < A
.1 NH /1 ˛


ıA
.1 NH /˛
NH

; with NH  1=2:
(C.14)
ıA
.1 NH  NL/˛
NH CNL  
NH
NH CNL  D
A
.1 NH  NL/1 ˛
(C.15)
D

ıA
.1 NH  NL/˛
NH CNL

; with NH  1=2 and NL  1=2:
First of all, note that the condition for a low-effectiveness equilibrium (C.13) is
identical to that in Proposition 1, hence when A.1C ı/1 ˛ > 1 there must still exist a
low-effectiveness equilibrium in the model with peer monitoring. Notice also that the
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condition for existence of a high-effectiveness equilibrium without peer monitoring
is identical to condition (C.14), except for the term   in the rst argument of the
condition. This implies that, whenever the condition for existence an ’H-equilibrium’
without peer monitoring is satised, then it must also be satised when there is peer
monitoring. As a consequence, when A.1C ı/1 ˛ < 1 there must still exist an ‘H-
equilibrium’ in the model with peer monitoring.
Next, recalling the denition of N1 in (11), from (C.14) it follows that, even when
A.1C ı/1 ˛ > 1, an H-equilibrium will exist if the condition
A.1 N1/˛
N1

ı   N1
1 N1

<  (C.16)
holds true. Given that, when A.1C ı/1 ˛ > 1, N1 < N0, then condition (C.16)
requires that  is sufciently large.
Lastly, consider the specic case when A.1C ı/1 ˛ > 1 and condition (C.16)
holds true. In a mixed-type equilibrium we must have that:
A.1 N/˛

ı   N
1 N

D  .N  NL/ : (C.17)
Notice now that when condition (C.16) holds true, then there must necessarily exist
some value 0 < NL < N < N0, with N > NL, satisfying condition (C.17). This
implies that when A.1C ı/1 ˛ > 1 and condition (C.16) holds true there also exists
a mixed-type equilibrium satisfying (C).
Derivation of Equilibrium Regions in Figure 4
(i) H-equilibrium Region. This type of equilibrium arises when i < 1 < V p for any
0  N  1=2, where V p is given by (17) and i by (18). For i < V p to hold for any
0  N  1=2 it sufces to pin down when it holds for N D 1=2, which in turn leads
to
t < Nt  .1  ı/ = .2  ı/ : (C.18)
Next, for i < V p we need that
N <
ı .1  t /C t
1C ı .1  t / : (C.19)
Therefore, plugging the RHS of (C.19) into (18), leads to the condition that i < 1
whenever
A <
1
.1  t /˛ Œ1C ı .1  t /1 ˛ : (C.20)
As a result, the region bounded by (C.18) and (C.20) features a high-effectiveness
equilibrium.
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(ii) L-equilibrium Region. This type of equilibrium needs, rst, that condition (C.20)
fails to hold. Second, it also needs that .i /
 < V p holds, so that mH -types choose
the private sector. For .i /
 < V p to obtain, it must be that
A >
Œt C ı .1  t / 1 
21 ˛ .1  t / 11 
: (C.21)
Notice now that the RHS of (C.20) is equal to the RHS of (C.21) when t D Nt , while
the former lies above (below) the latter when t < Nt (when t > Nt ). As a consequence,
the region exhibiting an ‘L-equilibrium’ is given by A > .1  t / ˛ Œ1C ı .1  t /˛ 1
whenever t  Nt and by (C.21) whenever t > Nt .
(iii) Mixed-Type equilibrium Region with f > 1=2. From the previous results it
follows that when (C.20) holds and t > Nt , we must necessarily have an equilibrium
in which all mH -types choose the non-prot sector, while mL-types lie indifferent
between the two sectors, and a fraction of them choose the non-prot sector as well.
(iv) Mixed-Type Equilibrium Region with f < 1=2. From the previous results it also
follows that when both (C.20) and (C.21) fail to hold and t > Nt , we must necessarily
have an equilibrium in which mL-types choose the non-prot sector, while mH -types
lie indifferent between the two sectors, and a fraction of them choose the non-prot
sector as well.
Proof of Proposition A.1.
Part (i). First, recall that in an H-equilibrium Ne D 1=2. Second, using (A.7) and (4)
when N D N H , we have that
ıA
 
1 N H
˛
N H
D A 
1 N H
1 ˛ , N H D ı1C ı < 12:
Therefore, an H-equilibrium must necessarily featureN H D ı= .1C ı/, withmH types
indifferent across the two occupations. In such an equilibrium, they obtain a level of
utility equal to A.1C ı/1 ˛ . Third, from (A.5) it follows that this solution is a Nash
equilibrium, as the best response by mL-type non-prot managers would be eL D 0
when 2A.1C ı/1 ˛ < 1, while eL D 1 otherwise. In both cases, A.1C ı/1 ˛  1
implies that selsh agents should prefer the private sector to the non-prot sector.
Moreover, this must be the unique Nash equilibrium solution, since the incentives for
an mL-type agent to start a non-prot will decline with the average level of Ne, which
in equilibrium will never be below 0:5 as implied by (A.3).
Part (ii). Preliminarily, let rst dene eN  ı=.2C ı/. Note then that, when Ne D 1, the
payoff functions (A.4) and (4) are equalized whenN D eN ; namely,U H .eN/D V .eN/.
Next, notice that, for a given Ne, both (A.4) and (A.6) are strictly decreasing in N ,
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while they grow to innity as N goes to zero. Hence, to prove that a low-effectiveness
equilibrium exists, it sufces to show that the condition A  Œ2= .2C ı/1 ˛ implies
U H .eN/  U L .eN/. To prove that the low-effectiveness equilibrium is unique, notice
rst that an H-equilibrium is incompatible with A  Œ2= .2C ı/1 ˛ . Therefore, the
only other alternative would be a mixed-type equilibrium with all agents indifferent
between the private and non-prot sector. Yet, for (A.4) and (A.6) to be equal, it must
be thatD=N D 2 Ne. This equality, in turn, implies that all activities must yield a payoff
equal to 1, however, whenA  Œ2= .2C ı/1 ˛ , this would be inconsistent with Ne < 1,
therefore a mixed-type equilibrium cannot exist either.
Part (iii). First of all, following the argument in the proof of part (i) of the proposition,
notice that an H-equilibrium cannot exist, since when A.1C ı/1 ˛ > 1 selsh agents
would like to deviate to the non-prot sector and set eL D 1. Secondly, notice that a
necessary condition for an L-equilibrium to exist is that U H > 1 when N D eN and
Ne D 1, but replacing N D eN and Ne D 1 into (A.4) yields a value strictly smaller than
1 when A < Œ2= .2C ı/1 ˛ . As a result, when A.1C ı/1 ˛ < A < Œ2= .2C ı/1 ˛
the equilibrium must necessarily be of mixed-type, with all agents indifferent across
occupations. This requires that U H .N / D U L .N / D V P .N / D 1. From (4) we
obtain that V P .N /D 1 impliesN mixed D 1 A
1
1 ˛ . In addition,U H .N /D U L .N /
requires that 2 Nemixed D D=N , which using N mixed D 1 A1=1 ˛ leads to
Nemixed D 1
2
ıA
1
1 ˛
1 A 11 ˛
: (C.22)
Therefore, using the facts that eH D 0:5 and eL D 1, the levels ofN H andN L in (A.9)
immediately obtain. Lastly, to prove that this equilibrium is unique, notice that emixed
in (C.22) lies between 0:5 and 1, thus there must exist only one specic combination
of N H and N L consistent with a mixed-type equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition B.1
First of all, notice that NH D 0:5 cannot hold in equilibrium, as (B.1) implies that
in that case D=N D 0, no agent would choose the non-prot sector. We can then
focus on three equilibrium cases: (i) N L D 0 and 0 < N H < 0:5, with mL-types
strictly preferring the private sector, (ii)N L  0:5 andN H D 0, withmH -types strictly
preferring the private sector, and (iii) 0  N L  0:5 and 0  N H < 0:5, will all types
indifferent across occupations.
Case (i). For this case to hold in equilibrium, the following condition must be
veried:
ıHA
 
1
2
 NH

.1 NH /1 ˛NH„ ƒ‚ …
UL.NH ;0/
<
A
.1 NH /1 ˛„ ƒ‚ …
y.NH ;0/
D
"
ıHA
 
1
2
 NH

.1 NH /1 ˛NH
#
„ ƒ‚ …
UH .NH ;0/
: (C.23)
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For U L .NH ; 0/ < y.NH ; 0/ in (C.23) to hold, NH > ıH=.2C 2ıH / must be true.
Next, since U L .NH ; 0/ < U H .NH ; 0/ , U L .NH ; 0/ < 1, and y.NH ; 0/ is strictly
increasing in NH while U H .NH ; 0/ is strictly decreasing in it and U H .1=2; 0/ D 0, a
sufcient condition for (C.23) to hold in equilibrium is that
ıHA
 
1
2
 NH

.1 NH /1 ˛NH
< 1 when NH D ıH
2C 2ıH ;
which in turn leads to the condition A < Œ.2C ıH / = .2C 2ıH /1 ˛ .
Case (ii). This case occurs when the following condition holds:"
1
2
ıHA
.1 NL/1 ˛NL
#
„ ƒ‚ …
UH .0;NL/
<
A
.1 NL/1 ˛„ ƒ‚ …
y.0;NL/

1
2
ıHA
.1 NL/1 ˛NL„ ƒ‚ …
UL.0;NL/
: (C.24)
Using the expressions in (C.24), notice that for U L .0;NL/ > y.0;NL/ to hold,
NL < ıH=2. But, since 0 < ıH  1, NL < ıH=2 and U L .0;NL/ > y.0;NL/ cannot
possibly hold together. As a consequence, in equilibrium, U L .0;NL/ D y.0;NL/
must necessarily prevail, implying in turn thatNL D ıH=2. Next, since U L .NH ; 0/ >
U H .NH ; 0/, U L .NH ; 0/ > 1, a sufcient condition for (C.24) to hold in equilibrium
is that
1
2
ıHA
.1 NL/1 ˛NL
> 1 when NL D ıH
2
;
which in turn leads to the condition A > .1  ıH=2/1 ˛ .
Case (iii). Keeping in mind that U L .NH ; 0/D U H .NH ; 0/, U L .NH ; 0/D 1, this
case will arise when the following equalities hold:
A
.1 NH  NL/1 ˛„ ƒ‚ …
y.NH ;NL/
D ıHA
 
1
2
 NH

.1 NH  NL/1 ˛ .NL CNH /„ ƒ‚ … D 1
UL.NH ;NL/
: (C.25)
Recalling the denition ofN in (13),U L .NH ;NL/D 1 leads to ŒıH .0:5 NH / =

1 A1=.1 ˛/D
1, from where we obtain:
NH D 1
2
  1 A
1
1 ˛
ıH
: (C.26)
Next, using again the denition of N in (13), we may obtain NL D

1 A1=.1 ˛/ 
NH , which using (C.26) yields:
NL D

1 A 11 ˛
 1C ıH
ıH
  1
2
: (C.27)
Lastly, (C.26) implies that NH > 0, A > .1  ıH=2/1 ˛ , while (C.27) means that
NL > 0, A < Œ.2C ıH / =.2C 2ıH /1 ˛ , completing the proof.
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